UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
3rd meeting
held on
Monday, 18 October 1993
at 10 a.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

CONTENTS

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of the publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/48/SR.3
2 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the "disarmament agenda" of previous sessions would remain crucial in relation to many pressing questions. The remarkable political developments of the recent past would help the Committee move towards consensus on hitherto untractable issues. The Committee should endeavour to merge resolutions which dealt with the same topic whenever political changes offered an opportunity to do so. The delegations involved needed to display sufficient flexibility and political will to compromise. The Committee might also wish to cluster the traditional topics of its work and the respective resolutions under so-called "head items". Delegations should also consider whether their resolutions still corresponded to the changed political climate after the end of the East-West confrontation.

2. The Committee might do well to narrow its focus with regard to the traditional disarmament agenda and, at the same time, widen it to comprise broader issues of peace and security. In view of the changes that had been taking place in the world, and the troubling new trends which threatened peace and security, the Committee should consider whether the arms control agenda comprehensively reflected its responsibilities and whether streamlining and rationalization were the only means to revitalize its work. Fewer resolutions on disarmament might signal a decline in the Committee's importance if such reduction was not accompanied by the opening up of other avenues for meaningful political activities. The Committee would not be giving the right signal to Governments, the public and public opinion makers if it simply reduced its workload at a time when military conflicts were flaring and means to prevent or contain them were desperately being sought.

3. The Committee's new name seemed to imply that the Committee was not intended to be a forum that focused exclusively on arms control questions. The Secretary-General had suggested that there was a need for the practical integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda. At the same time, however, the Committee had to keep in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations which circumscribed the scope for action by the General Assembly and its committees. However, notwithstanding Article 12 of the Charter, the Committee could, within the framework of its general responsibilities, make recommendations with regard to a dispute or situation which was not before the Security Council. The Committee could also formulate recommendations, guidelines or general principles relating to international peace and security with a view to promoting a deeper understanding of the concepts of preventive diplomacy, confidence-building and post-conflict peace-preserving measures. By putting the traditional disarmament agenda into the broader context of security concerns, emerging conflicts and risks to peace, the Committee might be in a better position to narrow it down to those items which were of paramount interest.

STATEMENT BY THE UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

4. Mr. GOULDING (Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs) recalled that in his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" (A/C.1/47/7), the Secretary-General had argued that disarmament should be integrated into the broader structure of international peace and security rather than be pursued in isolation. There were considerable opportunities for progress in the field of disarmament. The 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provided an important opportunity for an internationally agreed response to the concerns about the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons. His Department had redeployed staff to provide the necessary input for the successful preparation of the Conference.

5. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin substantive negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of 1994 showed that a new commitment was being made to realize that long-standing objective, especially on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. The successful completion of the negotiations on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was an example of the work that could be done by the Conference on Disarmament with the participation of all sectors of the international community. That Convention would be the first multilateral instrument with comprehensive provisions for implementation which would apply equally to all parties. New commitments to negotiate a workable verification system for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction were also important, as had been recognized at the Third Review Conference.

6. There were signs of a new level of seriousness in tackling the difficult problems of the post-cold-war world. Solid work for cooperation and confidence-building had been undertaken in a number of regions; the strengthening of regional cooperation systems to include security issues provided a form of preventive diplomacy based on transparency. The Committee had an important role in encouraging those processes.

7. The proliferation of conventional weapons was one of the most ghastly legacies of the cold war. In his previous capacity as Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, he had been vividly aware of the extent to which conflict control and resolution in many parts of the world were complicated by the vast quantities of weapons which had been injected into those areas over the past two decades. Concerted action, primarily by Governments in their own territories, was needed to mop up the huge quantities of weapons which were in the hands of political groups or private individuals. The establishment of the new United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was an important step in creating greater openness and transparency in military matters. The indiscriminate use of landmines was another issue which required the urgent and decisive attention of the international community.

8. In order to respond to these opportunities and challenges, the Secretary-General had decided to rename the Office for Disarmament Affairs the "Centre for

(Mr. Goulding)

Disarmament Affairs" and to keep it in New York as an integral part of the Department of Political Affairs. With the agreement of the General Assembly, the staff would be brought back to its earlier strength with the proposed addition of three posts, primarily in connection with the work on the Register of Conventional Arms. The Secretary-General had instructed the Office to consider how confidence-building measures, verification and other techniques which had been developed and tested in the field of arms control and disarmament could be further developed and used as instruments of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building, with the consent of the Governments concerned. In that connection, the Centre had an advantage in that quite a few staff members had served in peace-keeping missions in recent months, bringing valuable experience from the field.

9. The Conference on Disarmament remained the principal forum for the negotiation of international agreements on arms control and disarmament. In view of the resignation of Mr. Bérasatégui, Secretary-General of the Conference, the Secretary-General had appointed Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, to be the Secretary-General of the Conference and to act as his Personal Representative to it, on an interim basis, with effect from 5 December 1993. Mr. Petrovsky would carry out those functions concurrently with his functions as Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva.

10. The work of the Centre's three regional centres was currently being re-examined in the light of the new opportunities for progress on a regional basis. The role of the centres might have to be redefined to ensure that their activities had an impact in the regions they served and formed an effective part of the Secretariat's response to the opportunities and challenges it faced.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS

11. Mr. MARIN-BOSCH (Mexico) said that for some time, the Conference on Disarmament had been feeling the impact of the rapid changes in the international situation; for the second consecutive year, its report to the General Assembly contained concrete results. The decision to undertake the long-postponed negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be a turning-point in the international community's efforts to stop and reverse nuclear proliferation in all its aspects. That decision had been possible, in large part, because of the change in position of the new United States Administration with regard to a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Unfortunately, it had not been possible to reach agreement on enlarging the composition of the Conference in 1993 because of a solitary negative voice. It was to be hoped that the country concerned would reconsider its position.

12. Washington and Moscow were beginning to reverse the nuclear-arms race, with the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), the Lisbon Protocol and the START II Treaty. Just as the nuclear-arms race had a dynamic of its own, promoted by the interests of the military and industrial complexes, the process of reducing those arsenals had its own dynamic which would demand ever larger reductions of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Marin-Bosch, Mexico)

However, in 10 years, when the provisions of the START treaties were fully implemented, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States of America and Russia would still be larger than those of the late 1960s when the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been signed. Moreover, the world was flooded with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and the international community had yet to agree on a clearly defined path with regard to those weapons of mass destruction.

13. Where nuclear testing was concerned, it had been possible to hope that the nuclear-weapon States would show restraint, thus benefiting the forthcoming negotiations on the subject. However, on 5 October 1993, China had broken the de facto test moratorium, and in the capitals of other nuclear-weapon States the debate had been reopened regarding the continuation of nuclear testing. That would have negative repercussions on the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The resumption of testing had already had immediate political consequences, and could affect directly the dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation. The nuclear-weapon States would have little authority to demand from others what they themselves were unwilling to do, and to conduct a few tests, small or very large, before closing the door definitively to others did not seem a very serious pattern of behaviour. The question arose of whether the nuclear-weapon States enjoyed special privileges. As NPT Parties, the five had undertaken to continue negotiations "to seek to achieve the discontinuation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", as the text of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) put it. Moreover, article VI of the NPT stated that each of the Parties to the Treaty undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and a comprehensive test ban was the key to that "cessation of the nuclear arms race".

14. Thirty years ago Mexico, like other members of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), had pointed out that the PTBT represented a "first step" towards the complete prohibition of nuclear tests and towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, while on signing the PTBT, the United States Secretary of State had stated that history would eventually record how the world dealt with the unfinished business of peace. Over three long decades the "business of peace" had remained unfinished. It was true that in the 1970s there had been attempts to negotiate a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but that opportunity, and others, had been squandered. Hence the initiative taken by several countries, including his own, to seek a comprehensive test ban by amending the PTBT. That process continued, and in August 1993 important advances had been achieved during the consultations held in New York by the President of the Amendment Conference. It had been agreed that the PTBT amendment process complemented other efforts and offered obvious advantages in certain areas over other approaches. In the meantime the Conference on Disarmament had decided to negotiate a CTBT beginning in January of 1994.

15. But the road between the Conference's decision and the CTBT negotiation itself was proving somewhat difficult. During the past week, differences had begun to emerge in Geneva as to how best to utilize the time between October and

(Mr. Marin-Bosch, Mexico)

January. Obviously some nuclear Powers wanted a rather slow pace, whereas the majority of the Conference members preferred a faster one. The members of the Group of 21 had even suggested that the Conference set 1994 as the target date for the conclusion of a CTBT.

16. Given the Conference's decision to undertake negotiations in January, it was obviously important to translate that political agreement at once into one on paper. To that end, an effort must be made to find compromise formulas ensuring an expeditious negotiation, and members of the Conference should therefore begin at once the discussion of the two main aspects of the future CTBT: the scope of the prohibition and its verification system. However, rapid enough progress would certainly not be made if there was insistence on delaying the negotiations or conducting more nuclear tests.

17. The NPT prohibited its non-nuclear-weapon Parties from acquiring nuclear weapons and therefore from carrying out nuclear tests. But several dozen countries had not yet adhered to the NPT. Would they and the rest of the international community accept the establishment of a kind of testing quota for each of the nuclear-weapon States before the CTBT's entry into force?

18. The five nuclear-weapon States had said that they were ready to conclude a CTBT. But their motives were not necessarily identical, because of the different levels of nuclear development involved. Nevertheless, all appreciated, to varying degrees, the advantages that a CTBT would have in strengthening the horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Some even saw it as a step to ensure vertical non-proliferation, and thus as paving the way towards nuclear disarmament.

19. That point opened up an area of fundamental importance. To speak of the five nuclear-weapon States was to make a formal distinction, based on the NPT and on a merely chronological consideration. But other considerations led to a different approach. For example, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had nuclear weapons but had never tested; South Africa had had six devices without testing them and now said that it no longer had them; India had had at least one; it was generally assumed that Israel had nuclear weapons, while it was believed that there were other countries that also had them. Nevertheless, the international community remained attached to the NPT and its somewhat archaic definitions. The fact was that, in the 1990s, of the lines between nuclear-weapon States and some non-nuclear-weapon States were becoming blurred, with some of the latter importing large quantities of plutonium for their advanced civilian nuclear industry. Those and other highly industrialized countries were "potential nuclear-weapon States", since they could produce a nuclear device in a matter of months or weeks. Then there were the so-called nuclear "threshold States", countries that had significant nuclear programmes but were not parties to the NPT. And now there was a third category of non-NPT countries, the "temporary nuclear-weapon States" including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa.

20. The foregoing were some of the questions which the NPT Parties should examine during the preparatory process of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Another question was what had happened in Iraq, a party to the NPT, and why. United Nations and IAEA inspectors had found an impressive amount of

(Mr. Marin-Bosch, Mexico)

material in Iraq betraying an ambitious nuclear programme: it seemed impossible that for years, especially in the 1980s, so-called "sensitive" material had been exported in such quantities without any of the exporting States (all of them NPT Parties) suspecting that the Iraqis were building something? The question also arose of the impact on the future of the NPT non-proliferation regime of the recent case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

21. The Chemical Weapons Convention attempted to remedy those rather confusing situations regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention required each Party to declare, once it entered into force, whether it possessed chemical weapons, whether there were such weapons on its territory, whether it had transferred or received them since 1 January 1946, and whether there were or had been chemical weapon facilities on its territory. Therein lay the key to the CWC's uniform regime for all parties. In relation to chemical, and also biological, weapons, there was nothing resembling the "caste society" that existed in the nuclear field, and there, too, have to disappear if a genuine, universal and equitable nuclear non-proliferation regime was to be built. Nuclear-weapon States (and some others) could not continue to demand a right to observe others' nuclear installations, whether unilaterally or through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That was certainly not conducive to the climate of confidence or openness so often required of other countries with regard to other weapons and weapons systems.

22. The international community in general and the five nuclear-weapon States in particular now had an opportunity to move forward decisively in the field of nuclear disarmament. The preparatory process of the 1995 NPT review and extension conference offered the best vehicle to undertake a frank dialogue on the future nuclear non-proliferation regime.

23. The question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects and of ballistic missiles was gaining increasing importance. His delegation believed that the time had come to request the Geneva Conference to undertake a more intense and formal examination of that subject, and that it merited consideration in the different multilateral disarmament forums, including the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Secretary-General should prepare, with the help of a small group of governmental experts, a brief study on the question, which was of vital importance to the international community. His delegation intended to explore with other interested delegations the possibility of submitting a draft resolution in that regard.

24. Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt), speaking as President of the Conference on Disarmament, introduced the annual report of the Conference on its work during the 1993 session (A/48/27). The current report did not, as had been the case in 1992, transmit an international instrument for consideration by the General Assembly, but the Conference had, however, worked very hard on a number of substantive and organizational matters, thus advancing its consideration of issues of vital importance for international peace and security. In particular, on 10 August 1993 the Conference had decided, inter alia, to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a CTB, with consultations being held between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994 on the specific mandate for, and organization of, the negotiations. Thus, for the first time since the

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963, the multilateral negotiating forum of the international community was proceeding to the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. That long-sought objective of the international community seemed now to be closer than ever before. The forthcoming negotiation on an item to which the General Assembly had assigned the highest priority since the conclusion of the PTBT implied a political commitment which would require the necessary Secretariat resources to ensure that the negotiations received support.

25. With regard to the composition of the Conference, the Special Coordinator for membership had conducted detailed consultations before submitting his report, which appeared in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the annual report. As noted in paragraph 15, many members and non-members had made statements on the subject, but no conclusion had been reached before the end of the annual session. The President had accordingly been mandated to continue consultations to achieve consensus during the intersessional period. He had started those consultations, and intended to continue them until the beginning of the 1994 session. While difficulties remained, members were fully conscious of the need to expand the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. That common ground would be helpful in achieving the expansion of the Conference.

26. With respect to the Conference's methods of work, informal open-ended consultations had been held, and the discussions and their results were reflected in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the annual report. The shorter report the Conference was submitting to the Assembly's current session was the result of the review undertaken on its improved and effective functioning.

27. The activities of the four ad hoc committees set up by the Conference during the 1993 annual session deserved to be highlighted. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban had made progress in its consideration of various issues of importance to the agenda item, and had also reviewed aspects relating to structure and scope, as well as verification and compliance. There had been general recognition that in order to ensure compliance with a future CTBT, an effective internationally applicable verification system would be required. Preliminary work had also been started, for the first time in the history of the Conference, on non-seismic means of verification. It was widely recognized in the Conference that the adoption of a decision to give the Ad Hoc Committee a negotiating mandate was a major turning-point for multilateral work towards a CTBT.

28. The Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space had considered various areas relating to its future work, and had also expressed its appreciation of the organization by the Friends of the Chairman of open-ended consultations on the issues of CBMs, terminology and legal aspects related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There had been wide agreement that the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent such an arms race remained the Committee's fundamental task and that the proposals on CBMs could form an integral part of those agreements. It had been recommended that at the beginning of the 1994 session, the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space with an appropriate mandate to continue substantive work on all the issues before it.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

29. The Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, continuing its review of that important subject, had expressed the view that there was a need to step up efforts in the light of recent transformations in the international political climate. Accordingly, it had agreed to recommend that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session.

30. In 1993, the Conference had for the first time established the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. At its first session, the Committee had covered a great amount of new ground, including a substantive exchange of views on a number of complex issues surrounding that subject. It had discussed excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms, military holdings and procurement through national production, and arms transfers and transfers of high technology with military applications, as well as weapons of mass destruction. Eighteen working papers had been submitted to it, several of them containing concrete proposals. Although agreement had not been reached on them, delegations had concurred that many of the issues they dealt with worked to promote trust, confidence-building and stability. The Ad Hoc committee had therefore recommended that it be re-established at the beginning of the 1994 session of the Conference.

31. The work of the Conference in 1993 had continued a positive trend which had started the year before with the landmark agreement on the convention prohibiting all chemical weapons. New ideas and common ground were emerging as international cooperation replaced the confrontations of the Cold War. The decision to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was one of the outstanding developments in the post-Cold War period. While the negotiations would certainly not be easy and a number of sensitive questions would have to be addressed, he was confident that the Conference would be able to discharge its heavy responsibilities as the international disarmament negotiating body of the international community.

32. Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia) said that three significant events had taken place since the Committee had last met. First, the Convention on Chemical Weapons had been completed, opened for signature and had attracted widespread international support. The Provisional Technical Secretariat set up in that connection was a fine example of multilateral cooperation; its activities were already well under way, which augured well for the effective implementation of the Treaty. He urged all signatory States to take the necessary steps so as to ensure the earliest possible implementation of the Convention. Likewise, he appealed to non-signatory States to reconsider their position with a view to ensuring the universal application of the global ban on chemical weapons.

33. Second, the important decision by the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a CTBT heralded a new and long-awaited era in international disarmament negotiations. The Treaty would serve the dual purpose of inhibiting the production of new generations of nuclear weapons as well as enhancing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Australia was confident that the bulk of the work on the Treaty could be completed in time for the NPT review conference in April 1995. However, it was important that work on the political, legal and

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

verification aspects of the Treaty should proceed in parallel and should be mutually reinforcing. Australia was willing to consider the possibility of allowing additional time for negotiations at the 1994 session of the Conference on Disarmament. In view of the progress made towards the start of negotiations on a treaty, the recent decision of China to violate the de facto moratorium on nuclear testing which had been observed for more than a year was indeed regrettable.

34. Australia hoped for greater unilateral assurances of security in the form of a joint declaration or other binding statement by States which had retained nuclear weapons that they would not use them against countries which had undertaken a commitment to non-proliferation. Together with the CTBT, such action would greatly facilitate the review and extension of NPT.

35. The extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference was essential not least to provide a secure legal basis for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Australia, like many other countries, was in favour of the indefinite extension of the Treaty and would continue to participate actively in the preparatory meetings for the 1995 Conference.

36. The end of the cold war era had provided both challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and opportunities to strengthen it. Anxious about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia, his country would welcome a more active dialogue on nuclear matters between India and Pakistan. Likewise, Ukraine and Kazakhstan should be encouraged to fulfil their obligations under the Lisbon Protocol to START I and accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, following the example of Belarus.

37. Australia also welcomed South Africa's cooperation with IAEA since its accession to NPT, and in particular its policy of full transparency regarding its nuclear activities. However, the continued failure of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with the IAEA safeguard obligations remained a matter of deep concern.

38. Australia fully supported efforts undertaken since the Gulf War to strengthen the effectiveness and transparency of the IAEA safeguards system, as well as the work of the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), and encouraged other countries to do likewise. With regard to the latter, he stressed the importance of the effective implementation of safeguards agreements for the prevention of clandestine nuclear activities and the promotion of confidence in the NPT-based non-proliferation regime.

39. The tightening of nuclear-use export controls and strengthening of nuclear supplier arrangements would also underscore the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. Furthermore, regional non-proliferation arrangements such as the treaties of Tlatelolco in Latin America and Rarotonga in the South Pacific complemented the international non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. Steps towards the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the other regions would not only forge a more positive attitude towards non-proliferation arrangements in those regions but also encourage regional support for the NPT in the lead-up to the 1995 conference.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

40. Australia looked forward to participating in the coming years in negotiations for an end to the production of fissionable material and for multilateral non-discriminatory controls on the purchase of destabilizing missile systems, particularly those used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

41. The risk posed by the proliferation of biological weapons had tended to be underestimated as a potential threat to international security. Australia had long been concerned that the effectiveness of the only global instrument for the abolition of such weapons - the Biological Weapons Convention - was limited by the absence of mechanisms to verify compliance with the obligations under the Convention. It therefore welcomed the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts which concluded that verification measures would enhance the effective implementation of the Convention, and also provided a sound technical basis for developing the verification mechanism required. In that connection Australia supported the convening of a special conference for that purpose, and suggested that other States parties should do likewise by notifying one of the depositary countries without delay.

42. Since the end of the cold war, the Committee had been able to address more effectively the issue of regional security, as well as to encourage arms control and security and confidence-building measures in particular regions. Progress had been made in his region with the ASEAN countries taking a leading role in establishing a dialogue on security in the wider Asia Pacific region by setting up the ASEAN Regional Forum. Australia had also participated in the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group co-sponsored by the United States of America and Russia, and looked forward to further developments in that area.

43. As to military transparency particularly in regard to armaments, he noted with satisfaction that many countries had already sent their replies to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. He looked forward to participating actively during the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament in the future development of global transparency mechanisms and arms acquisition guidelines. Another important matter which must be addressed in the near future was the need for more effective rules governing the use of land mines which called for a review of the Convention on Inhumane Weapons.

44. In conclusion, he recalled that he had been entrusted with the task of looking into how to expand the Conference on Disarmament so that it could perform its duties more effectively. Following extensive informal consultations, he had proposed to the Conference a compromise solution on which it had regrettably been unable to reach agreement. None the less, he was confident that, with the assistance of the President of the Conference, a solution could be found which would meet with general approval.

45. Mr. PIZARRO (Chile) said that despite the end of the cold war, important work still had to be done in the field of disarmament. His Government deplored the recent violation by China of the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, which had prompted the other nuclear Powers to reconsider their commitments in that respect.

(Mr. Pizarro, Chile)

46. One matter of particular concern was the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. While Chile endorsed the purpose of the Treaty, it continued to view it as a discriminatory instrument, believing that the inequality of rights and obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States had largely been responsible for the greater proliferation of such weapons. None the less the Chilean Government had reconsidered its position on the NPT in the hope that the parties would also be more flexible and allow the participation of observers in the preparatory meetings for the 1995 Conference. It was important to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the current political climate for the unrestricted discussion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

47. A further cause for concern was the lack of agreement on the question of expanding the Conference on Disarmament. He urged the parties concerned to intensify their consultations with a view to resolving the remaining difficulties regarding the proposal by the representative of Australia, which his country regarded as a viable alternative.

48. As it approached its fiftieth anniversary, the United Nations must take up the challenge of becoming a true catalyst of international peace and security. In that connection, he endorsed the proposals for rationalizing the work and revising the agenda of the Committee. The aim should be for the Committee to issue more binding norms which would effectively strengthen international peace and security.

49. The Latin American and Caribbean region was firmly committed to the cause of disarmament, as borne out by the political will of Argentina, Brazil and Chile to ensure implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, not to mention the agreements on nuclear matters between Argentina and Brazil, whose provisions went beyond those of comparable agreements.

50. With regard to the Convention on Chemical Weapons, the final declaration of a regional seminar held recently in Santiago drew attention, inter alia, to the importance of ensuring the universal applicability of the Convention as well as the effective and balanced operations of its verification regime. Furthermore, the Mendoza Accord on the total ban of chemical and biological weapons had already attracted broad support at the regional level. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) was currently before the Chilean Chamber of Deputies for ratification.

51. The large number of replies received by the Centre for Disarmament Affairs in connection with the Register of Conventional Arms was encouraging. It was important to improve the Register with a view to making it a real means of promoting confidence at bilateral, regional and global levels. To that end his Government had not only reported on transfers but also on its stocks and indicated its willingness to participate in forthcoming meetings of governmental experts on the subject.

(Mr. Pizarro, Chile)

52. Disarmament problems remained urgent, and their relationship to international security was more evident than in the past. His Government was concerned that the human and material resources allocated to the Office of Disarmament Affairs no longer met its requirements.

53. One of the main problems which had come to the fore since the emergence of a new international order was that of human security, which went beyond traditional notions of security and was determined in many parts of the world by poverty. In that connection he suggested that the Committee should bear four considerations in mind during its discussions. First, the security of individuals was now as important as, if not more important than, security of the State. Second, security problems in one country, region or geographical area could become a source of instability that extended beyond the frontiers of the area in question. Third, a modern concept of security must take account of economic, social, environmental and other problems. Lastly, the ending of the cold war had provided an opportunity to resurrect concepts formerly thwarted by ideological confrontation such as "zones of peace". There had been ample proof in Latin America that such zones were a useful means of promoting cooperation and understanding as well as easing potential military tensions.

54. Disarmament must be a world-wide process which, taking due account of the characteristics of each region, should bring about real improvements in the living conditions of people in the developing countries. He believed the United Nations was the appropriate forum to achieve those aims as laid down in its Charter. It was therefore essential not to miss the unique opportunity afforded by the current political climate to achieve substantial progress in international disarmament, peace and security which would benefit generations to come.

55. Mr. MROZIEWICZ (Poland) said that since 1989, the international arena had undergone radical changes which had affected the very essence of international security. While since the end of the cold war some sources of instability and regional conflicts had ceased to exist and new opportunities emerged to settle old disputes, other dormant conflicts had come to life, fuelled by an increase in nationalist and even xenophobic sentiments. For decades international security had hinged on the balance of military forces, but now the role of the Security Council and the involvement of regional organizations had considerably increased as the political means of guaranteeing security had come to the fore.

56. Poland enjoyed good relations with its neighbouring countries through cooperation with inter alia the VISEGRAD Group and the Baltic States. It also encouraged the strengthening of ties with the countries of Western Europe, the United States of America and Canada; joining the north Atlantic Alliance and the European Community were among the priorities of Polish foreign policy.

57. The fundamental challenge facing Europe at present was the establishment of a system which would provide equal security for all European countries. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had an important role to play in that regard and could constitute a forum for the settlement of disputes and prevention of conflicts. If necessary, the CSCE might request the intervention of the relevant military alliances. They would have the dual role

(Mr. Mroziewicz, Poland)

of alliances in the sense of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and of institutions exercising Pan-European responsibilities, a role to which Poland attached particular importance.

58. The NTP was a major pillar of international security, and should therefore be indefinitely extended at the 1995 review conference. The success of that Conference would be promoted by constructive negotiations on the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Motivated by its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and with the support of the Eastern European Group, which had not yet held the presidency of an NPT review conference, Poland intended to nominate a candidate for that presidency.

59. The proliferation of materials and technologies for the production of weapons of mass destruction and the clandestine sales of such materials and technologies to regions of potential conflict posed an increasing challenge to international peace and security, and should therefore remain high on the agenda.

60. Welcoming the signing by some 150 States of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, he stressed the urgent need to ensure the timely entry into force of that Convention and cooperation by signatory States with the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Netherlands, together with Canada and Poland, would submit a draft resolution on that issue.

61. Poland welcomed the establishment, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, of an Ad Hoc Committee on the establishment of Transparency in Armaments. The regional workshop organized earlier in 1993 in Poland by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs had facilitated participation by States from the region in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, to which Poland attached great importance.

62. New realities and disarmament priorities necessitated an overhaul of the disarmament machinery, including such measures as rationalizing the agenda of the First Committee and streamlining its modus operandi, thus reducing the number, and enhancing the credibility, of its resolutions. He welcomed the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to focus on four items only in 1993, with the prompt establishment of the respective ad hoc subsidiary bodies, but regretted the failure to reach consensus on the vital issue of the expansion of the Conference's membership. It was essential to find a compromise solution which accommodated the different aspirations of States seeking membership of the Conference without undermining its negotiating strength.

63. Mr. CISSE (Senegal) said that the optimism generated by positive changes in the international context and the increasing involvement of the Organization in international peace efforts was tempered by concerns at the resurgence of armed conflicts. Only complete and universal disarmament would make possible the multilateral cooperation, and consequent economic and social development, necessary to ensure that those conflicts could be overcome.

(Mr. Cisse, Senegal)

64. Senegal was therefore encouraged by the significant progress made in the area of disarmament during 1993, including the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and hoped that the necessary steps would soon be completed to ensure its entry into force, which would lead to the historically unprecedented elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.

65. Senegal also welcomed the signing in 1993 by the United States of America and the Russian Federation of START II, and hoped that the remaining obstacles to the ratification of the Lisbon Protocol would be overcome without delay.

66. He noted with concern that many issues, particularly those concerning procedure, relating to the 1995 Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained unresolved, and drew attention, in particular, to the question of the presidency of the Conference, signalling his delegation's support for the candidature of Ambassador Dhamapala, put forward by the Non-Aligned Movement.

67. As a non-nuclear State, Senegal particularly welcomed the recent decision to entrust the Disarmament Commission with the negotiation of a complete test-ban treaty, and pledged its readiness to contribute actively to that important project.

68. At the regional level, Senegal had welcomed South Africa's announcement that it would dismantle its nuclear weapons. He stressed the need for IAEA to be fully notified of the inventory of nuclear material resulting from that process of dismantling and, in general, for all such nuclear material to be placed under total control or transferred out of Africa, with a view to ensuring the denuclearization of the African continent.

69. In the Asian region, Senegal welcomed the joint declaration by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America on efforts to achieve a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and to pursue negotiations with IAEA.

70. Despite progress in the reduction and control of certain categories of weapons of mass destruction, the precarious political, economic and social equilibrium in the world was increasingly threatened by the growing build-up of conventional arms in certain vulnerable regions. His delegation therefore welcomed the establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms, and hoped that current discussions would lead to greater transparency in that area.

71. Efforts by the Organization to promote disarmament and arms regulation could only succeed with the support of all Member States, particularly the major Powers with their formidable military arsenals. Efforts to build a world of peace and security also necessitated combating hunger, poverty and sickness, which were capable, if left unattended, of becoming more serious threats to international peace and security than those posed by military arsenals.

72. Mr. PERRI (Brazil) said that, despite positive events in the post-cold-war world, such as the recent agreement between Israel and Palestine and the dismantling of apartheid, new conflicts had emerged and old ones re-emerged, rendering the maintenance of international peace and security much more complex than had been anticipated at the end of an age dominated by ideological confrontations. Particular significance attached, therefore, to preventive diplomacy, since peace-building through the promotion of a fair and equitable international order was the best diplomacy in a world in which political, military and economic imbalances still persisted.

73. As the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs had stressed in his statement to the General Assembly, the international agenda was, as before, structured around democracy, development and disarmament with their ramifications in the areas of human rights, environment and international security, and those three elements constituted the necessary foundations for peace in the new international order which the Organization was striving to build.

74. Among encouraging recent initiatives, he welcomed the signing of START II and the plans by the United States to prohibit the production of fissionable materials. The more peaceful international situation had created an opportunity to reduce military budgets and convert military industries into civilian uses. Brazil hoped that the resources freed in that process would stimulate economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing world, and, in that context, welcomed the proposal that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) should coordinate the establishment of the United Nations interdepartmental task force on conversion.

75. At the multilateral level, Brazil noted with satisfaction the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention by 150 countries and urged the remaining countries to add their signatures. In addition, Brazil welcomed progress in the areas of verification of biological weapons, control of conventional weapons and the prohibition of nuclear tests. It urged nuclear States not to resume testing and to persevere in their efforts to achieve a multilaterally agreed and internationally verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty, particularly since the cessation of nuclear tests was crucial in halting vertical proliferation and progress in horizontal non-proliferation could be jeopardized if vertical proliferation was not stopped.

76. He hoped that negotiations on expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament would be successfully concluded, thus meeting the need of further democratizing the Conference without impairing its efficiency.

77. He stressed the need to complete work at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament on its remaining agenda items, and drew attention to Brazil's special interest in promoting discussion on the item related to science and technology, in the belief that consensus among supplier and recipient countries on the proposed guidelines and recommendations would be of crucial importance in strengthening international security and promoting economic and social development. A more peaceful and prosperous international order would result from universal commitment to the use and transfer of high technology for exclusively peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Perri, Brazil)

78. He commended the significant achievements in the field of disarmament of such United Nations bodies as the Office (now Centre) for Disarmament Affairs, the regional Centres for Disarmament, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Nevertheless, the continued existence of nuclear arsenals still posed a threat to peace and security. In that connection, he expressed concern at the precarious situation in parts of the former USSR where strategic nuclear weapons were stationed.

79. Following the adoption of various international instruments by Brazil and other countries in the region, Latin America was on the verge of becoming a region in which nuclear weapons would be definitively banned. He hoped that the Treaty of Tlatelolco, recently approved by the Brazilian Government, would be adopted by other countries in the region and would be fully in force by the end of 1993.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
4th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 19 October 1993
at 10 a.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of the publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/48/SR.4
5 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

93-81672 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

1. Mr. CHAPPUIS (Observer for Switzerland) said that, since the chances of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) were better than ever before, Switzerland supported the granting of a mandate for those purposes to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Achievement of a CTBT would also facilitate the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was an important and well-tested instrument, but it entailed unequal obligations for its parties and the extension of the Treaty and the accession of all States would mark a major contribution to the cause of non-proliferation.

2. Switzerland hoped that more countries would join the more than 150 which had already signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and that the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons would succeed in preparing an effective monitoring instrument. His Government was ready to provide industrial inspectors for the future control body and to place a mobile laboratory at its disposal.

3. Although 20 years previously States had doubted the necessity for a system to monitor biological weapons, recent developments had caused them fundamentally to revise that view and to establish the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (the VEREX process). Switzerland had always attached great importance to the evaluation of verification possibilities and therefore favoured the convening of a conference of States parties to that end.

4. Switzerland was convinced that the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva would continue to have a vital role in the years to come, and had requested admission to the Conference as a full member, in order better to be able to contribute to its work. It had been disappointed, therefore, by the failure to reach consensus on expanding the membership of the Conference at its previous session.

5. The Swiss people had been deeply shocked by the diversion of legally exported Swiss products for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, and the Government had subsequently imposed strict export controls. While international agreements were jointly implemented by the States parties, export controls remained national measures with no element of multilateral cooperation. Consequently, Switzerland hoped that disarmament agreements would be sufficiently strengthened to render such controls unnecessary.

6. Immense human suffering was also caused by conventional arms, and efforts must be made to strengthen international humanitarian law and to prevent certain types of particularly cruel weapons. Since the Charter of the United Nations established the right of States to have recourse to military force when their safety was threatened, no general prohibition of conventional arms was possible; instead, an effective and internationally accepted system of regulations should be devised.

7. The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was a major step forward, in terms both of promoting transparency and of furthering a

(Mr. Chappuis, Observer, Switzerland)

multilateral approach to arms transfers. War led to violation of the principles of humanitarian law, and wider accession to the Geneva Conventions and support for the International Committee of the Red Cross in its work on behalf of civilian populations were therefore important. In addition, Switzerland supported the proposal for a review conference in 1994 on the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. It was important to increase the number of parties to the Convention and to enhance respect for the norms currently in force by appropriate training measures within armed forces. The scope of the Convention should be widened to include non-international conflicts and to strengthen such measures as the demarcation and clearing of minefields provided for by Protocol II of the Convention. Switzerland strongly believed in the need for an effective prohibition on the use of anti-personnel mines as defined by the Convention and its Protocol II.

8. In conclusion, he stressed that armaments were less the cause than the consequence of conflicts and that efforts should be made to address the root causes of those conflicts, such as human rights violations, ethnic strife, political persecution, ignorance and extreme poverty. Those problems would be best tackled by a regional approach like that offered by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, which had achieved notable success in overcoming the cold war in Europe. Similar approaches could yield comparable results in other regions of the world, notably the Middle East.

9. Mr. WHANNOU (Benin) said that, despite the recent historic changes on the international scene, the world remained riven by civil wars, territorial disintegration and ethnic, religious and tribal confrontations. While the signing of START II by the two major nuclear Powers had been a major step forward, other nuclear Powers must be encouraged to follow suit. Moreover, START I must, once ratified by Ukraine, be implemented on the basis of the Lisbon Protocol. In addition, vigorous efforts should be made to renounce the policy of nuclear deterrence, to dismantle nuclear weapons deployed beyond national frontiers, to achieve a complete cessation of nuclear tests and to ensure that moratoriums on nuclear tests were not broken and, finally, to ensure that objective, and not selective, application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to dual-purpose facilities, compulsory inspection of suspect nuclear facilities, and reconversion of nuclear capacity to peaceful purposes. In addition, the 1995 NPT review conference would provide an opportunity to transform the Treaty into an effective instrument for full nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

10. Among other areas of concern, he drew attention to the issue of chemical weapons and stressed the need to secure the accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention of the few chemical weapon-possessing States which still remained outside it. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention, Benin believed that its effectiveness would be enhanced by a verification regime, and therefore supported the convening in 1994 of an ad hoc conference of parties to determine means of strengthening the relevant verification machinery. It was essential to harness the peaceful benefits of science and technology to advance the process of disarmament, inter alia, by ensuring that the destruction of existing weapons did not damage public health or the environment.

(Mr. Whannou, Benin)

11. International security was also threatened by non-military factors, such as dehumanizing socio-economic and environmental conditions, and in that regard too appropriate technology had a vital role to play. Benin therefore urged the speedy implementation, if necessary with modifications, of the action programme adopted at the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. If conflicts were to be prevented before they spiralled out of control, serious attention must be given to the socio-economic dimension of security. Strengthened international cooperation would assist the implementation of development programmes, whose financing would benefit from the long-awaited peace dividend. In that context, Benin looked forward to the forthcoming report by the Secretary-General on an agenda for development.

12. He welcomed the recommendations by the Disarmament Commission concerning regional disarmament measures, which should be further strengthened. While Benin supported the initiative put forward by the Secretary-General to review the mandates of the regional centres for disarmament in the light of new world realities, it expressed concern at the current problems faced by the centre for Africa, which was in danger of closing down. Increased efforts were required to ensure the final denuclearization of the African continent. In addition, African States were concerned at the dumping of dangerous and radioactive wastes and increased international cooperation was called for to combat that practice, using in particular the possibilities created by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

13. In other regions, the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT would be conducive to disarmament in South Asia, while in Latin America acceptance of the proposed amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco would permit its entry into force and subsequent wider accession to it.

14. The exploration of ways to enhance international disarmament machinery and to adapt it to new international realities had been considerably advanced by the Secretary-General's report on new dimensions of the regulations of arms and disarmament in the post-cold-war period. Benin stressed the need to ensure the proper interaction of the various components of such machinery, since disarmament should be the common business of all, pursued in the interests of all. The Security Council had a particularly important role to play in that endeavour, in accordance with its mandate under Article 26 of the Charter.

15. His delegation strongly believed that the membership of the Conference on Disarmament should be expanded and its selection processes made transparent and objective, with limited membership periods to enable all States to participate in its work. Since the Conference was responsible for negotiating multilateral disarmament accords of a universal scope it was important that its representation should also be universal.

16. Lastly, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs should be strengthened.

17. Mr. TANAKA (Japan) said that in a period of transition, it was more important than ever before to build confidence among nations through multilateral cooperation in order to maintain and strengthen international peace

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

and security. The international community must take measures to tackle the problem of both the transfer and the proliferation of various kinds of weapons.

18. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems was a problem that demanded urgent attention. The NPT provided an important legal framework for reconciling the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons with that of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, thus enhancing world security. Japan had on many occasions stressed the importance of strengthening that regime by enhancing its universality. It welcomed the accession of Belarus to the NPT and hoped that Kazakhstan and Ukraine would accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. It was important that all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, make serious efforts to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime. Japan supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty beyond 1995; however, that did not mean perpetuating the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

19. The international security environment was markedly different from that which had prevailed at the time of the Fourth Review Conference of NPT. The signing of the START II treaty represented significant progress towards nuclear disarmament. Japan hoped that Ukraine would speedily ratify the START I treaty and that sharp reductions would be achieved in nuclear arsenals on both sides. Japan had demonstrated its readiness to help promote the process of dismantling nuclear weapons by announcing its readiness to assist in related fields. The question of prohibiting the production of nuclear fissile materials for weapons purposes required the serious attention of all States.

20. Important progress had been made towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Japan welcomed the commitments announced by the United States, France and the Russian Federation to the moratorium on nuclear testing. Japan, the only victim of nuclear bombing, strongly objected to nuclear testing by any State. The suspension of nuclear tests had made possible the early initiation of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was of great significance in the history of nuclear disarmament.

21. It was deeply regrettable that China had carried out a nuclear test in October 1993; Japan hoped that the negotiations towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would not be impeded by the test. It urged China not to carry out any further nuclear testing, and called upon other nuclear-weapon States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would be an extremely important instrument, not only for halting and reversing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons but also for preventing their horizontal proliferation. Inasmuch as the Conference on Disarmament was the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, it was imperative that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty be negotiated by the Conference from the earliest stages. The negotiations should be given the highest priority.

22. Any substantive progress made on negative security assurances in 1994 could help build a favourable environment for the 1995 NPT review conference. Progress on concrete nuclear disarmament measures would have a positive impact

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

on the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as the outcome of the 1995 conference.

23. Japan attached great importance to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

24. The question of non-proliferation of systems for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction was also a matter for urgent international consideration. The Missile Technology Control Regime was an export control mechanism which had been effectively preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of such weapons and related technologies, and it had Japan's full support.

25. As had been demonstrated in the Gulf war, the uncontrolled transfer of conventional weapons could destabilize a region and thus give rise to armed conflict. Self-restraint by arms suppliers was essential. It was also the responsibility of the international community to take effective measures to stop the unregulated and unprincipled transfer of weapons. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was an important element in that endeavour; Japan hoped that a substantially larger number of States would join its regime. Japan would continue to cooperate with other nations to achieve broader participation and to improve and develop the Register. It felt that there was also a need to promote regional cooperation and to devise supplementary measures on transparency adjusted to the specific characteristics of each region. It supported the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to have the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments continue its deliberations in 1994.

26. Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil), speaking as Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, introduced the Commission's report (A/48/42) on the work of its 1993 session. The results of the 1993 substantive session had served to reaffirm the value of the Commission and to demonstrate that it was able to function effectively as a multilateral forum. The Commission had adopted by consensus the "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security".

27. The Commission had considered two important topics: the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons and the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. The first topic had been held over for conclusion in 1994; as to the second topic, the Commission had come very close to agreeing on a comprehensive set of substantive guidelines and recommendations. The Commission's decision to allow another year for the conclusion of work on that topic reflected the seriousness with which different countries, developed and developing, saw the need to engage in a greater degree of multilateral dialogue and cooperation.

28. The Commission would be holding an organizational session in early December. Before then, it would be necessary to settle the question of including a new substantive item in the Commission's agenda for 1994. Proposals for additional items already existed in the preamble to General Assembly resolution 47/54 A. At the organizational session, the Commission would elect a Chairman for 1994 who, in accordance with the principle of geographical

(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil)

rotation, was expected to be provided by the Group of African States. It would also elect the other members of the bureau and the chairmen of the working groups, including a chairman for the working group that would deal with the new item to be included in the Commission's agenda.

29. The results of the Commission's 1993 session confirmed that the United Nations was in a unique position to play a more productive role in the field of disarmament, at a time when a greater degree of dialogue, understanding and cooperation was clearly needed.

30. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that the optimistic atmosphere which had prevailed in the Committee the previous year had fast disappeared in the face of the outbreak of new or renewed regional and international conflicts to which the mechanisms set in place during the cold war were unable to respond. The situation was compounded by domestic problems, which placed restrictions on foreign policy and the resources available for international concerns.

31. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remained the greatest potential threat to international peace and security, although the significance of the proliferation of conventional arms, particularly in the conflicts being waged in the developing world, should not be underestimated. Greater responsibility was required on the part of all States, but above all those who manufactured and supplied such weapons. The Philippines had always advocated the elimination of weapons of mass destruction as well as the reduction of conventional arms. It looked forward to universal adherence to the NPT in the near future, since all the declared nuclear States and permanent members of the Security Council had become parties to the Treaty. The 1995 NPT review conference should both review the implementation of the Treaty and decide on its extension and his delegation was in favour of strengthening the NPT regime as well as of the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

32. With regard to nuclear testing, the Philippines maintained that a CTBT would be the most effective way to encourage the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore endorsed the mandate for negotiations conferred on the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It also supported the consultations being conducted by the President of the Amendment Conference of the partial test-ban treaty, which it had been agreed should be continued with a view to resuming the Conference.

33. The nuclear-test moratorium provided a healthy environment for negotiating a permanent ban on such tests, and his delegation was therefore disappointed that a test had recently been conducted in its region. It hoped that no further testing would take place and that all the nuclear Powers would step up efforts to negotiate a comprehensive and permanent ban.

34. Countries should be encouraged to take advantage of the current favourable political climate by entering into negotiations for the peaceful settlement of disputes with their neighbours, for real and lasting peace at the regional level and world wide could best be achieved through dialogue and mutual trust.

35. The Convention on Chemical Weapons, signed by the Philippines in 1993, was a major achievement in world disarmament, as it struck a fine balance between

(Mr. Arcilla, Philippines)

the imperatives of economic and technical development and verification measures. The Philippines also welcomed initiatives such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms which promoted openness and transparency - prerequisites for the rational reduction of armaments.

36. In South-East Asia the foundations for an era of peace and prosperity were being laid. Notable achievements by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) included the Declaration on the South China Sea, aimed at instituting a region of peace, cooperation and mutual confidence-building in disputed areas, and ongoing efforts to achieve a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

37. Mr. NORBERG (Sweden) said that the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention and START II in January 1993 and the agreement reached in the Conference on Disarmament in August 1993 to enter into formal negotiations on a CTBT were evidence that the world had entered a new phase of security cooperation and dialogue.

38. A verifiable CTBT would serve as an important tool for nuclear disarmament and against proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was crucial that a test ban be truly comprehensive, prohibiting all nuclear explosions, including so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. His Government was looking forward to the negotiations which were to begin in January 1994 and felt that the draft treaty it had submitted to the Conference in June 1993 could serve as a basis for them. A speedy conclusion of the matter would demonstrate continued momentum in the drive to limit and finally abolish all weapons of mass destruction.

39. Sweden was encouraged by the expressions of support for preventive measures to supplement a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and felt that an international agreement to ban production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and to control such material would both strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and provide an essential element in a comprehensive network of agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in general. It deplored the nuclear test carried out by China on 5 October 1993, but hoped, nevertheless, that the de facto moratorium on nuclear tests would be observed by all nuclear-weapon States and that China would refrain from further testing. The nuclear-weapon States had an important responsibility in that regard as further testing could jeopardize an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

40. No effort should be spared to strengthen the NPT, adherence to which was firmly established as a norm for international behaviour. All nations must become parties to the Treaty and faithfully implement existing safeguards agreements. The commitment of the parties to the Treaty would be decisive in the successful preparation of the NPT conference in 1995 and in providing for the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

41. The START agreements constituted another cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, they would be complete only with the adherence of all States in the former Soviet Union which had nuclear weapons on their territories. Ukraine should ratify START I without further delay, and it was imperative that Kazakhstan and Ukraine follow Belarus in acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

42. The dissolution of the Soviet Union had aggravated concerns about clandestine transfers of conventional weapons and even weapons of mass destruction. It was vital to minimize the risk of increasing black market sales of military arsenals at relatively low prices, particularly to areas of high political tension. Borders must be monitored - not least new borders - to ensure full control and transparency in that respect, and early warning systems were needed to indicate where and when national or international action was warranted. To that end, Sweden was cooperating with several members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in strengthening border and customs controls, and with the Russian Federation in the destruction of chemical weapons by providing expertise for such purposes.

43. Transfers of weapons of mass destruction must be prevented, but it was also necessary to monitor trade in essential components, equipment and weapons materials, such as uranium and plutonium, and to prevent the proliferation of know-how for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Opportunities should be sought to utilize the vast military expertise in the former Soviet Union for peaceful purposes and facilitate the process of conversion from military to civilian production. With that aim, Sweden had allocated funds to the science and technology centres to be established in Moscow and Kiev, which could give weapons experts the opportunity to contribute to peace and economic growth.

44. Over 150 States had now signed the Convention on Chemical Weapons, but only four countries had so far ratified it. For the Convention to enter into force at the earliest possible date it was imperative that States now take the necessary measures for speedy ratification. Ratification by the Russian Federation was of particular importance in view of the 40,000 tons of chemical warfare agents on its territory.

45. That Convention, including its verification regime, might serve as an inspiration for the international community to achieve the same goal in other fields. The Biological Weapons Convention could thus be equipped with adequate verification mechanisms, and his delegation urged the States parties to the Convention to request the convening of a special conference to examine the final report of the VEREX process.

46. Another important issue was the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, which could have disastrous consequences, and should be discussed as a separate item on a revised agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

47. The international community must strengthen its ability to respond to the problem of the spread of conventional weapons, and his Government welcomed the fact that the disarmament and arms control agenda was now increasingly focused on such weapons. Much, however, remained to be done. In 1993 national reports had been submitted to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms for the first time. For that instrument to acquire a universal character, however, it was essential for all Member States to provide information. Nevertheless, expanding the scope of the Register too rapidly could increase the difficulties of compiling data, and it should therefore be expanded in a careful and gradual manner.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

48. Sweden supported the convening of a review conference of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, primarily to negotiate stronger rules or mechanisms to protect civilian populations against the effects of anti-personnel mines, but also to discuss other weapon categories, such as naval mines and anti-personnel laser weapons.

49. Like the United Nations in general, the disarmament organs of the United Nations should be reformed to respond to new realities. Although the general division of labour between the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament was well established, at least in theory, there was a generally recognized need to continue to improve the working methods of all three bodies in order to ensure efficiency and to avoid duplication of work. He hoped that during the current session the First Committee would agree on appropriate steps to rationalize its work and reform its agenda, including the proposals that related substantive issues should be dealt with in clusters under one heading, that a number of topics should be dealt with on a biannual or triannual basis and that the consideration of clearly obsolete items should be terminated. Further steps should also be taken to allow the Disarmament Commission to focus in greater depth on important items and submit concrete recommendations on them. The Conference on Disarmament, after concluding an agreement on CTBT, should in future address other areas of particular significance, such as confidence-building measures for the maintenance of peace and stability and regional security arrangements. In addition, the composition of the Conference should be altered to correspond to present-day realities. The proposal worked out by Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia was constructive and should provide the basis for a solution to the problem before the end of the current year.

50. Mr. WISNUMURTI (Indonesia) said that the Committee was meeting at a time of extraordinary flux, great promise and unprecedented opportunities. The easing of ideological contention had opened vast new possibilities of significant arms reductions, while the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security had been further strengthened. The successful conclusion of START II had made an important contribution to reducing the arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and his delegation hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would follow suit and would work with the United States to seek a ban on the production of nuclear materials for weapons and institute international inspections of nuclear stockpiles.

51. The accession of Belarus to the NPT was a welcome development; his delegation was confident that Kazakhstan and Ukraine would likewise accede. It also welcomed the further impetus given to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the full applicability of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the progress made in the ongoing endeavours to implement the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. The universality and early implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons must remain one of the priority objectives of the international community. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty was to be applauded. His delegation shared the view of the Group of 21 that the time had come to proceed with all deliberate speed and to achieve the long-sought goal of a comprehensive test ban by 1994.

(Mr.Wisnumurti, Indonesia)

52. The resumption of testing by a nuclear Power earlier in the current month must be viewed with utmost concern. It was imperative that nuclear-weapon States refrain from a new round of testing and fulfil their commitment to negotiate a total ban by the year 1996. The timely conclusion of a CTBT was also of critical importance, for without it efforts to extend the NPT might be adversely affected, as the duration of the treaty had been explicitly linked to the fulfilment of obligations undertaken by the signatories, especially by the depositary States. Moreover, the provisions of the NPT needed to be carefully reviewed and reassessed in the light of the requirements of the 1990s and beyond. Thus, the success of the 1995 review conference would ultimately depend on an objective reappraisal of the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States and the endeavours to transform the Treaty into a truly universal non-discriminatory regime.

53. A genuine, global non-proliferation regime could be fostered by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) had for some years been seeking to establish a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the draft treaty for the purpose was in its final stage of preparation. Indonesia hoped that some nuclear Powers which had opposed the initiative would now be ready to reconsider their position. In the post-cold-war political setting their opposition had become untenable, especially since transit rights would remain unaffected in the regime envisioned for the region. Consultations would be held with other States, particularly the nuclear Powers, to secure their support in completing the draft treaty. Its early implementation would constitute a significant contribution by ASEAN to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

54. The ASEAN Ministers had decided in 1992 to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum, which would afford its members and other interested nations a regular opportunity for an exchange of views on security issues which, it was hoped, would help to forestall possible disputes and conflicts. Eventually, more institutionalized regional and international structures might evolve.

55. In the South China Sea, overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Spratly and Paracels Islands might escalate into threats to regional peace and security. Indonesia had sponsored a series of workshops to contribute to a better understanding of the issue, while ASEAN had called on the parties concerned to apply the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct in the area.

56. His delegation had listened carefully to the Chairman's observations concerning a more structured role for the First Committee and its revitalization. In Indonesia's view, the First Committee had an important role to play and specific contributions to make as a deliberative body with universal participation. As a forum for elaborating and clarifying a number of issues of pre-eminent concern to Member States, it had formulated concrete proposals and recommendations for consideration and action by other forums. Meanwhile, the trend towards greater understanding among Committee members had been reflected in the adoption of fewer resolutions - an increasing number of them by consensus - and the merging of identical resolutions. The Committee's debates had become more purposeful, constantly seeking wider areas of agreement. His delegation was therefore confident that the Committee could make a constructive

(Mr.Wisnumurti, Indonesia)

contribution to the goals of disarmament and security, and pledged its active participation in that effort. Indonesia had long supported the proposal for a rearrangement of the Committee's agenda so as to facilitate more rational and focused discussion. Such an arrangement, however, should not prejudge the substance of issues or infringe on the right of Member States to bring any relevant issues before the Committee.

57. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Kathmandu had played a pioneering role in seeking to strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and various regional and subregional organizations, and had given practical expression to the concept of regional approaches to disarmament. Its task, especially in stimulating new initiatives for negotiations and exploring fresh approaches to peace, remained unfinished. His delegation therefore called for the continuation of its activities.

58. Security and stability were pressing requirements in the Gulf region, which had experienced the environmental, economic and social consequences of conflicts in which weapons of mass destruction were deployed. With a view to building confidence and establishing the foundations for permanent peace, security and stability in the region, his country and fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council advocated the resolution of disputes through dialogue and peaceful means, and the strengthening of cooperation through good-neighbourliness.

59. Having supported and participated in the Middle East peace process, his country welcomed the Declaration of Principles signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel as a positive step towards a just, comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestinian question. The final settlement would be an essential factor in creating regional and international peace, security and stability, and would have a beneficial developmental, economic and social impact on the States and peoples in the region.

60. He reiterated his country's call for all parties in Somalia to cooperate with international and regional efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem there and thus safeguard the unity and national independence of Somalia. He likewise endorsed the efforts aimed at establishing a democratic South Africa where the people could coexist without being subjected to racial discrimination.

61. Meanwhile, a solution to the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the suffering of the population, particularly the Muslims, was among the most serious challenges facing the international community, which had shown itself powerless to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions aimed at curbing Serbian and Croatian aggression. His country therefore supported Bosnia and Herzegovina's right of individual and collective self-defence under the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

62. He urged all nuclear-weapon States to participate actively in the endeavours to conclude a CTBT and hoped that the aims of eliminating weapons of mass destruction and achieving a nuclear-test ban would be accomplished before the 1995 review of the NPT. Meanwhile, his country welcomed the United States initiative to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing and the positive response of nuclear-weapon States. The fact that 150 States, including his own, had

(Mr.Wisnumurti, Indonesia)

signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was a productive step towards reducing the threat to international security posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The international community should also tackle the threat posed by the use and development of conventional weapons.

63. His country sanctioned the trend for the United Nations, specialized agencies and regional organizations to play a significant role in regional disarmament, which also required the support of the nuclear-weapon States. It equally favoured the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones, in which connection it called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

64. Disarmament and the ensuing reduction in military expenditure would allow financial resources to be rechannelled into economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries, thereby strengthening international and regional security.

65. The CHAIRMAN said that the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons had asked to make a statement. Since during the informal consultations held with a number of delegations no objection had been raised, he would take it that the Committee wished to accede to that request.

66. It was so decided.

67. Mr. KENYON (Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) said that since the signing ceremony of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, the number of signatories to the Convention had reached 151, and 4 States had already ratified it. Such an unprecedented degree of unanimity testified to the quality and balanced nature of the text of the Convention, which had been universally recognized as an effective instrument for enhancing national and global security. At its fourth session two weeks previously the Preparatory Commission had decided to encourage all States that had not yet become signatories to the Convention to do so without further delay. However, signature was only the first step in a long process. Experience had shown that the Convention could only be effective if thorough and skilled preparations were carried out for its implementation and all States concerned were willing to cooperate.

68. The drafters of the Convention had realized that considerable preparatory work would be required for its implementation. Detailed procedures needed to be developed for inspections, submission of declarations and various details of chemical technology, while the machinery to carry out those procedures, namely, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and in particular its technical secretariat, must be put in place. Moreover, considerable work had to be done by States themselves so that they would be in a position to fulfil their legal obligations and participate fully and effectively in the implementation of the Convention. The scope of the obligations under the Convention as well as the nature of its verification system were unprecedented

(Mr. Kenyon)

and, together with the time constraints imposed by its scheduled entry into force in 1995, represented a great challenge to those involved.

69. The Preparatory Commission was designed to assist the international community in meeting that challenge. With the assistance of the Provisional Technical Secretariat, it was developing appropriate procedures that would serve as a framework for the future organization and assist States in their own preparations. The Commission had set up the necessary infrastructure and concluded a Headquarters agreement with the host State - the Netherlands. Good progress had also been made in developing the procedures necessary for the implementation of the Convention. The Commission had already held four formal sessions. More specific issues were considered in the working groups meeting concurrently with the plenary, two of which, on organizational issues and on verification procedures, were currently in existence. Expert groups dealing with those specific subjects and technical cooperation and assistance, met between the plenary sessions. Their recommendations were circulated to all member States, then considered at working group level and finally by the plenary meetings. Such procedures allowed all signatory States to take part in the decision-making of the Commission.

70. The Provisional Technical Secretariat was gradually acquiring greater technical expertise and, in addition to servicing the meetings of the Commission, was able to provide assistance to member States. By the end of the year, the Provisional Technical Secretariat should have approximately 60 staff members employed in its five divisions. There were plans to expand the core staff in order to continue preparatory work for the implementation of the Convention on a broader scale. Furthermore, inspectors and additional support staff would be recruited once 65 States had ratified the Convention. The budget and programme of work for 1994 would be examined by the fifth plenary session of the Preparatory Commission in December 1993.

71. One of the most important functions of the Provisional Technical Secretariat was to develop, in cooperation with member States, the mechanisms required to verify compliance with the Convention. Detailed verification procedures were currently being prepared with the assistance of experts from national delegations. In view of the importance of its work, the Verification Division would be the largest in the secretariat, comprising six branches, one of which would be responsible for training and coordinating inspectors, analysts and other specialist staff for the Technical Secretariat. The Inspectorate would, to a great extent, be the raison d'être of the future organization, whose reputation would depend largely on the integrity and competence of the inspectors in that service. Training modules for future inspectors were being prepared by an expert group and supplementary training programmes had been launched by a number of member States.

72. Another important function of the Provisional Technical Secretariat was to assist States in their preparatory work for the implementation of the Convention. Such work included the establishment of a national authority, as envisaged by article VII of the Convention, the preparation of national databases for initial and routine declarations, and even preparations for destruction of chemical weapons. In that connection, the secretariat had

(Mr. Kenyon)

undertaken a study on the national authority describing the various options for establishing such an entity.

73. The organization was proceeding on the basis that the Inspectorate must be ready to carry out verification activities as soon as the Convention entered into force. In order to meet that deadline, at its second plenary session in April 1993, the Commission had decided on three "milestones" for planning purposes. First, the initial draft of the procedures and requirements for the implementation of the verification and other provisions in the Convention must be concluded by the end of 1993. Second, by the middle of 1994, the revised draft procedures must be completed and preparations made for the recruiting and training of inspectors and other key staff members of the Technical Secretariat immediately after the entry into force of the Convention. Third, during the last six months prior to entry into force of the Convention, the Provisional Technical Secretariat would be expanded and final preparations made for the implementation of the Convention.

74. Furthermore, member States had been requested to provide estimates, on a preliminary and confidential basis, of the number of facilities that would need to be inspected. In that connection, a meeting had taken place between the expert group on chemical industry facilities and representatives from the chemical industry which had provided the latter with an opportunity to convey to the Commission their views on the implementation of the Convention. Further meetings would be organized along those lines.

75. Since public support was required for the early entry into force of and universal adherence to the Convention, the Provisional Technical Secretariat was preparing to launch an international information campaign on the subject. It would also be working closely with Governments, representatives of chemical industry associations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations to create awareness about the requirements for data declarations and the on-site inspection regime. However, it remained the primary responsibility of the competent authorities in the signatory States to inform their domestic industry on the relevant provisions in that area.

76. It was also important that the national authorities established by signatory States should disseminate information about the benefits to be derived from the Convention. Many developing countries were concerned that the Convention would lead to tighter controls on the exchange of chemical technology and equipment that was crucial to their commercial and industrial development. The Convention struck a balance between ending the proliferation of chemical weapons and promoting the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge necessary for industrial, agricultural, medical and pharmaceutical development. Signatory States would however be subject to restrictions on trade in chemicals with non-signatory countries, and their existing chemical trade policies would have to be reviewed and brought into line with the aims of the Convention.

(Mr. Kenyon)

77. In conclusion, he stressed the need for the continuous cooperation and support of member States in the run up to the entry into force of the Convention. He was confident that the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat would do their utmost to contribute to the achievement of world peace and security.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
5th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 19 October 1993
at 3 p.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of the publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/48/SR.5
19 November 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

93-81696 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

1. Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium), speaking on behalf of the European Community and its member States, said that, despite the end of the cold war, a twofold threat loomed over international détente: a rising tide of conflicts and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the accumulation of conventional weapons.

2. The conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia were a tragic example of the violent excesses of nationalism, which had reared its head in the wake of the cold war. The Community and its member States were participating actively in the search for a peaceful and lasting settlement in the region through the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, through direct contacts with the parties involved, through the presence of the European Community Monitor Mission, and within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The States members of the Community had provided over half the personnel for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and, through the Western European Union (WEU), were participating in measures to enforce the United Nations embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube. They were also providing substantial humanitarian assistance. The Community and its member States were making every effort to achieve a just and viable settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was based on the principles of the London Peace Accords of 1992 and was acceptable to the three peoples which together made up that country.

3. The European Community and its member States welcomed the progress made by the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its potential for producing ballistic missiles. They urged that that work be continued until Iraq fully complied with all United Nations resolutions.

4. The European Community and its member States reaffirmed their appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7). During the resumed session of the First Committee in spring 1993, at which meetings were devoted to a reassessment of the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, the Community and its member States had submitted specific recommendations with a view to the reorganization and rationalization of the work of the various multilateral organs dealing with disarmament, which had been largely taken into account in General Assembly resolution 47/54 G of 8 April 1993. The inclusion of an agenda item on that question in the agenda of the current session offered hope that the Committee had taken the first step towards rationalizing its work.

5. The signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction had been a historic event. The Convention provided for the complete elimination of chemical weapons within 10 years and for an innovative control regime. For the Convention - which had been signed by 154 countries, four of which had ratified

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

it - to become an authoritative and effective instrument, full participation was essential. That would require the adoption by individual countries of legislation and procedures for the practical implementation of the Convention, and the establishment of the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons by the time the Convention entered into force, which was expected to be in early 1995. The European Community and its member States expressed their satisfaction with the competent and businesslike manner in which the temporary secretariat of the Organization had begun its work in The Hague. It was essential that all the States which had signed the Convention should participate actively in the plenary sessions of the Preparatory Commission and in the working group of experts.

6. The European Community and its member States attached great significance to the full implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) which had entered into force in November 1992 and which, together with the Concluding Act of the 1992 Extraordinary Conference of States signatories to CFE (CFE-1A) and the Vienna Document of 1992, provided the basis for a significant strengthening of military and political stability and cooperation in Europe. The Community and its member States called upon all Parties to the treaty to observe faithfully all of its provisions, in particular the obligation to reduce the size of their armed forces, within the time-limit agreed at the CFE-1A Conference.

7. The Community and its member States emphasized the importance they attached to progress in the work of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation. In that connection, they had submitted specific recommendations concerning a code of behaviour relating to the inter-State and intra-State aspects of security, as well as recommendations regarding transfers of conventional weapons. They believed that agreement among all States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe with regard to questions of transparency in armaments, limitations on weapons and arms control would promote further progress in disarmament, and they appealed to all States participating in CSCE to ensure appropriate representation in the Forum, since the success of the Forum's work depended to a great extent on their full participation. Furthermore, the States members of the Community attached enormous importance to the entry into force as soon as possible of the Treaty on Open Skies of 1992, which they believed to be a unique confidence-building measure encompassing the entire territory of the signatory States.

8. Nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament remained among the most important disarmament priorities of the Community and its member States. They warmly welcomed the treaties between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1991 (START-I) and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1993 (START-II). Since the entry into force of the START-II Treaty was organically linked to the implementation of the START-I Treaty, it was essential for the relevant parties to ratify the START-I Treaty and thereby fulfil their obligations under the Lisbon Protocol of 1992.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons was a serious threat to global and regional security and stability. The Community and its member States believed

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

that the prompt entry into force of the nuclear arms control agreements which had been concluded and implementation of decisions on a unilateral basis in the area of nuclear arms control were of the greatest importance, and they supported the efforts of individual States to assist the States of the former USSR concerned in dismantling, within the specified time-limit and in the best possible security conditions, the arms designated for dismantling under the Agreement. In that spirit, they were contributing to the creation in the Russian Federation of an international scientific and technical centre, which they hoped would soon be able to assist in redirecting researchers in the former USSR employed in the military sector into civilian tasks.

10. The European Community and its member States noted with satisfaction the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. They also welcomed the decisions taken by France, the United States of America and the Russian Federation to suspend nuclear tests, as well as the confirmation by the United Kingdom that it would not conduct any tests as long as the moratorium announced by the United States remained in effect. The members of the European Community could not remain indifferent to the recent nuclear test conducted by China, which had been the first in more than a year.

11. As the Security Council had clearly announced at its high-level meeting in January 1992, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, like the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, constituted a threat to international peace and security. The European Community and its member States reaffirmed their steadfast support for nuclear non-proliferation in general and, in particular, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which they considered to be the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. They urged the States parties to that Treaty to pursue with them the goal of the unconditional extension of the Treaty in 1995 for an unlimited period. Furthermore, they noted with interest the proposals aimed at combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons put forward by the President of the United States at the opening of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

12. Believing that nuclear non-proliferation would be best served by universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and complete fulfilment of the obligations undertaken under that Treaty, the European Community and its member States welcomed the recent accession to the Treaty of a number of States, as well as the strengthening of the safeguards regime. They urged all countries which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay and to conclude general safeguards agreements with IAEA. That applied, in particular, to those former republics of the USSR which had so far not honoured their commitments under the Lisbon Protocol.

13. The European Community and its member States welcomed the efforts of IAEA to strengthen the safeguards regime and, in particular, the reaffirmation by the IAEA Board of Governors of the right of IAEA to conduct special inspections. They recalled their proposal regarding the establishment, of a register on a voluntary basis, including information on the production and transfer of nuclear materials and equipment. Their firm belief in the need to ensure strict compliance with the obligations undertaken by States had been confirmed by the existence in Iraq of a secret nuclear programme and by the obstacles created by

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

Iraq to the implementation of the rules established by IAEA and of United Nations resolutions.

14. The European Community and its member States took note of the unilateral decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend the process of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That positive step should be followed by an unconditional reaffirmation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its obligations under the Treaty. They urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate immediately with IAEA with regard to the full implementation of the safeguards agreement and called upon that country to reaffirm its commitment to respect the bilateral agreement on inspections which had been concluded with the Republic of Korea.

15. The drawing up at Harare of a draft treaty for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa demonstrated the importance of nuclear disarmament and the interrelationship between regional and global disarmament. With respect to export controls, the European Community and its member States noted with satisfaction the decision of the group of nuclear material suppliers that an agreement on safeguards should be a precondition for the delivery of nuclear materials, and it called upon other States providing nuclear materials to do likewise. All States Members of the Community were parties to the Missile Technology Control Regime, which they believed was a useful instrument for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They were in favour of the further strengthening of that regime and appealed to all countries to adopt its guidelines. Furthermore, they noted with satisfaction that the Australian Group had introduced a comprehensive and agreed mechanism for the control of the export of dual-use substances and equipment relating to chemical and biological weapons. They advocated revising the rules of the Australian Group so that the obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons would be taken more fully into account.

16. The Community and its member States expressed their support for the work carried out in 1993 by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly with regard to verification measures. Furthermore, they had noted with interest the Study on the Application of Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space (A/48/305) which had been prepared by a group of governmental experts pursuant to General Assembly resolution 45/55 B of 4 December 1990.

17. The Community and its member States were convinced that transparency in armaments could contribute very substantially to the creation of a climate of trust. A first step towards enhanced transparency and restraint in conventional arms transfers should be the full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 46/36 L of 9 December 1991 and 47/52 L of 15 December 1992. They were gratified to note that the Register of Conventional Arms had been in operation since the beginning of the year and that 80 countries had submitted the requested data to the Secretary-General. In addition, they appealed to all States which had not yet contributed information to the Register, including States which were not involved in arms exports or imports, to do so as soon as possible. The Community and its member States actively supported the work of the Conference on Disarmament, pursuant to resolution 46/36 L, on the question of transparency in armaments. In their opinion, the work of the Conference on the question of the

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

modalities for the expansion of the Register to cover military inventories and purchases related to national production was an important contribution to the work of the group of governmental experts which would convene in 1994.

18. The Community and its member States were considering the question of amending the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, in particular, the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II). They urged all member States to reduce the number of deaths and injuries, especially among the civilian population, resulting from the excessive use of anti-personnel mines in the armed conflicts raging in a number of regions of the world. They urged all States Parties to the Convention to comply strictly with the provisions of Protocol II. France had requested the Secretary-General to convene a review conference to consider amendments to the Convention, if possible in 1994. The Community and its member States hoped that such an initiative would lead to an increase in the number of States Parties to the Convention, which currently stood at 37, and that the review conference would lead to increased compliance with the Convention and enhance its effectiveness.

19. In the opinion of the Community and its member States, enhancing the effectiveness and the authority of the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction would contribute to an effective verification regime. In that connection, they welcomed the positive and inspiring results achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts which had been assigned the task of identifying and examining potential verification measures. They appealed to all States Parties to the Convention to request the Depository States to convene a special conference to examine the results of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts and to take decisions regarding further efforts which should lead to the conclusion of a protocol on verification. They urged States which had not yet done so to accede to the Convention on Bacteriological Weapons and to make their contribution to the confidence-building measures which had been strengthened or extended during the Third Review Conference in 1991.

20. Since the end of the cold war, significant developments in the field of regional disarmament had occurred in Europe thanks to the efforts of CSCE. The extension of regional disarmament measures to other regions would promote world disarmament. The States members of the European Community noted with satisfaction the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of international security (A/48/42, annex II). The Community and its member States would continue in the future to support any initiative that would lead to the strengthening of security in any given region. Furthermore, they invited all States which were members of the Disarmament Commission to take an active part in work on questions relating to science and technology and nuclear disarmament and emphasized the importance of agreement on an agenda for the forthcoming session of the Commission.

21. The Community and its member States welcomed the conclusion by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of an agreement on mutual

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

recognition and commended the Israeli and Palestinian leaders for their courage and foresight. They reaffirmed their commitment to the cause of world peace and hoped that similar progress would be made in the areas of mutual trust, stability and arms control. They were prepared to participate in international arrangements arising out of the implementation of the agreement, to expand their already substantial assistance to the occupied territories and to contribute to all forms of regional economic cooperation.

22. At its resumed session in the spring of 1993, the First Committee had reaffirmed the unique role of the Conference on Disarmament as the only multilateral body for conducting negotiations on disarmament, and in doing so reaffirmed its special status within the disarmament mechanism of the United Nations. The member States of the European Community commended the effectiveness with which the four ad hoc committees of the Conference had begun their work in the new international climate, which called for an increasingly multilateral approach. They favoured significantly increasing the membership of the Conference on Disarmament and regretted that it had not yet been able to reach a consensus acceptable to all on that issue. They supported the efforts of the President of the Conference and hoped that such consensus would soon be reached.

23. The new international climate provided a historic opportunity to reduce the number of weapons in the world and to create an atmosphere of mutual trust. The European Community and its member States would do everything within their power to ensure that the current session of the First Committee was able to make new progress in that difficult but promising direction.

24. Mr. HERMAN (Hungary), noting there had been some positive developments in the field of the strengthening of international security and the promotion of disarmament and arms regulation, said that his Government had always devoted special attention in its foreign policy to the limitation, reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Since the end of the bipolar world system, the significance of such efforts in the ongoing process of developing a new structure of international relations had increased considerably. It would be a fatal error if, as during the cold war period, the international community were to build that structure on a dubious balance of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and on the theory of mutual deterrence. Such a course of events would undermine the stability and security of the regions concerned.

25. His Government attached great significance to the ratification of the START-II Treaty and its adjustment to current realities following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and to a ban on nuclear tests, introduced unilaterally by the majority of the nuclear Powers. The international community had finally managed to achieve a historic breakthrough in the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, which gave reason to hope that, in the not too distant future, progress would also be made in the field of biological weapons.

26. The implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons required the unflagging attention of Governments; at the same time, attention should not be diverted from numerous other unresolved issues, such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, with particular emphasis on the forthcoming 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

(Mr. Herman, Hungary)

Nuclear Weapons, the comprehensive prohibition of all nuclear tests and the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

27. Despite the disintegration of the former dictatorial regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the radical political and economic changes and reforms in every country of the region had not yet progressed sufficiently to ensure that those processes were irreversible. In addition to inherited economic problems, problems inevitably arose owing to the period of transition, which led to increased social tensions that could, in the absence of requisite prospects for the future, weaken and even undermine democratic institutions.

28. The only way to ensure progress in that situation was to adopt a comprehensive approach to security. A practical manifestation of that approach would be the establishment of a common European security structure in which the United Nations would have its place and role in the same way as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Council of Europe and the institutions of Euro-Atlantic integration. Those institutions should further improve their cooperation in identifying, as early as possible, the roots of potential conflicts, removing them, preventing hostilities and settling and eliminating conflicts that continued to surface. Preventive diplomacy and effective cooperation among those institutions should assume an even greater role in ensuring European and international security.

29. His country paid particular attention to NATO and to attaining membership in that Organization, which played a decisive part in the process of creating a new security structure for Europe. Recent cooperation between the United Nations and NATO had proved clearly that cooperation between organizations responsible for, and capable of, assuring and guaranteeing security was necessary and, in the current situation, vital.

30. Aware of the fact that the United Nations and NATO now had to face a growing demand for peace-keeping activities, his country had decided to play a more active role in such activities and, in proportion to its financial capabilities, would begin, the following year, to train peace-keeping units to participate in the operations of both organizations.

31. A positive example of such cooperation was the way in which the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations had cooperated with the European regional institutions and organizations in connection with the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the banning of flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also with NATO in the context of a possible use of air power. His country attached great importance to the fact that NATO and the Western European Union had expressed their willingness to cooperate closely in the field of peace-keeping under the auspices of the United Nations.

32. The Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace" had also made a significant contribution to adjusting peace-keeping to the new circumstances. On the basis of the experience gained, in particular in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, his country saw the possibility of further refining the theoretical approach to the issues and developing a new generation of peace-keeping activities in which there would be no rigid distinction between

(Mr. Herman, Hungary)

traditional peace-keeping and peace-enforcement activities which were also geared to handling crisis situations, either within individual States or in disintegrating State formations.

33. Mr. GRAHAM (United States of America) said that the rapid succession of events following the end of the cold war, both positive and darkly threatening, had emphasized the need to reassess programmes of action in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and to pursue efforts aimed at adapting arms control activities to the current international security environment. A good start had been made in that process, but much remained to be done.

34. It should be borne in mind that arms control was a policy tool available to all, and it could and should be used by each State, not only for itself, but for the good of the entire international community. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that arms control was, by nature, fundamentally political. In essence, it was about shaping relations, expectations and behaviour. It could provide useful guidelines along roads too infrequently travelled which led to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the effective and non-violent management of competing interests. If arms control was to play that role successfully, four priority tasks had to be accomplished.

35. The first was to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. In that regard, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had already been signed by almost 160 parties, fulfilled an important role. For more than 20 years, that Treaty had successfully contained the spread of nuclear weapons and facilitated the efforts of the United States and other countries to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. The security benefits of that Treaty were evident in every region of the world. For example, South Africa's adherence to the Treaty in 1991 had been a concrete contribution to regional efforts to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in Africa. Adherence to the Treaty by all of the States that had emerged from the former Soviet Union would help eliminate the risk of dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons and would facilitate productive relationships with neighbouring and other countries. Full compliance with the Treaty by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was essential to reducing the level of tension in Asia. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy had greatly developed on the basis of the Treaty. Consequently, his country would make every effort to secure the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty in 1995.

36. Activities designed to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not, however, be restricted to measures to strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States supported two initiatives to that end and called on all members of the international community to join it in that support. The first was a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or the separation of plutonium for nuclear explosive devices or outside the system of international safeguards. It would complement measures relating to fissionable nuclear material, such as eliminating, where possible, excess stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium and applying the strictest safety standards and international accountability to existing stocks of such materials; eliminating the need for enriched uranium in civil nuclear

(Mr. Graham, United States)

facilities; encouraging more restrictive regional arrangements to limit the production of fissionable material in unstable regions of instability where there is a high risk of proliferation; ensuring that IAEA inspectors had access to the fissionable material of the United States no longer needed for deterrent purposes; and purchasing highly enriched uranium from the former Soviet Union and other countries for peaceful use as reactor fuel. The second initiative, which represented a major policy change by the Clinton administration, was the rapid completion of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The United States welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban the necessary mandate, and it hoped to play an active role in negotiations on that issue. Attainment of that goal would be assisted if all the nuclear Powers observed the continued moratorium on nuclear testing. In that connection, the United States deeply regretted the decision by China to conduct an underground nuclear explosion, and urged it to refrain from further testing.

37. The United States was equally determined to work for the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. The signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention represented a major milestone in that endeavour; the accession to the Convention of more than 150 States was encouraging, yet still insufficient, and the United States appealed to all States to sign the Convention to ensure that adherence was universal. The United States also supported further efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, including through the creation of a transparency regime to enhance its effectiveness. It also appealed to all States parties to give serious consideration to the idea of convening a conference to identify and examine potential verification measures under the Convention, and supported the early convening of such a conference.

38. The appearance of advanced missile capabilities in the arsenals of a growing number of States was radically transforming the geostrategic landscape and creating the threat of the use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against civilian populations, however far removed from areas of military confrontation. In the context of its new non-proliferation initiative, the United States intended to promote the use of the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a global non-proliferation norm and would seek to use the MTCR as a mechanism for taking joint action to combat the proliferation of missile technology.

39. Strengthening all existing non-proliferation foundations would also help accomplishment of the second priority task, the establishment of universal arms control norms. To that end, financial support should be given to IAEA, which had a vital role in applying international safeguards under the NPT. States should also be prepared to share with IAEA any information relevant to its safeguard responsibilities, and to give it strong political support. The commitment of the United States to the observance of international norms was also manifest in its own non-proliferation policy and, in that context, the adoption of effective export controls underlined its seriousness of purpose and its recognition that multilateral agreements and international export controls were complementary instruments for achieving arms control and non-proliferation objectives.

(Mr. Graham, United States)

40. The third major task on the current arms control agenda was to apply the relevant experience and confidence-building measures to the settlement of regional disputes. Positive developments in that area over the previous year had included the initiation of a security dialogue by members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN); the continued exploration by Latin American States of regional arms control possibilities; the steady progress of the multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East peace process; and negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. At the same time, there was cause for concern that interest in the adoption of such measures was not universally shared. Some States declined to implement their share of the collective responsibility to take practical arms control measures, preferring to talk of controlling the arms of others, primarily the super-Powers. In the view of the United States, the 80 replies submitted to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms established under General Assembly resolution 46/36 L on transparency in armaments, represented a good response - but not good enough. The Register could clearly be strengthened and the United States called for efforts to increase the participation of member States and to improve the quality of the information submitted. In addition to its proposals on enhancing transparency and openness, in particular that States should exchange information on military holdings and procurement through national production, the United States had given its consent to ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies. That Treaty would also contribute to greater openness and transparency in military matters in Europe.

41. Finally, the fourth major task on the arms control agenda was to eliminate excess stocks of arms and inordinate defence industry capacity, the heritage of the cold war era. One of the major goals for the United States in that area was ensuring the swift entry into force of the START I and II treaties. While the United States believed that nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union were under reliable control, the breakup of the Soviet Union had created new concerns about the security of those nuclear systems. The United States Congress had authorized the allocation of approximately US$ 1 billion over the previous two years, and planned to authorize an additional US$ 400 million for the coming year, to assist in the safe and secure dismantling of weapons of mass destruction and to help prevent their proliferation.

42. Even before the Berlin wall came down, work to address another legacy of the past had already begun: the problem of conventional weapons, whose greatest concentrations had been in Europe. Nearly a year had elapsed since the initiation of the three-year cycle of measures to reduce major stocks of conventional weapons, provided for under the CFE Treaty, and the United States hoped to see that positive trend continue. Efforts to review the provisions of the Treaty were in no one's interest.

43. All States had a stake in the successful conversion of the defence industry. Finding alternative employment for the weapons scientists of the former Soviet Union was a major concern and to that end, short-term scientific research and development projects were to be funded through the new international science and technology centres in Moscow and Kiev. In addition, those scientists could create long-term high technology civilian enterprises which could be commercially viable.

(Mr. Graham, United States)

44. Increasing concern was caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. In that connection, the United States, together with other States, was working on an initiative in the First Committee to control the export of mines.

45. The international community would not reach its goal of creating a more stable and peaceful world if States proved unable to reverse the dangerous trend of proliferating weapons of mass destruction; if it was not possible to establish and sustain strong international non-proliferation norms; if no progress was made in the resolution of disputes in those regions of the world most prone to eruptions of violence and to conflicts; and if the last vestiges of the cold war were not eliminated once and for all. At the same time, changes in the world situation suggested that prospects for replacing the antagonisms of the past with cooperation, for creating a progressively more stable strategic balance, for preventing proliferation and for quelling regional conflicts were entirely realistic. To that end, joint efforts must continue to ensure effective arms control and confidence-building measures.

46. Mr. PONCE (Ecuador) said that, during the past year, there had been a number of positive changes in the international climate. At the same time, there had been some developments which represented a serious threat to international peace and security and revealed the flaws in the current system of international relations, namely, the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the re-emergence of extremist ideologies in Europe and some parts of Asia, the emergence and revival of serious disputes among the former Soviet republics, and the proliferation of internal conflicts in Africa and some regions of Asia.

47. On the basis of experience, it could be inferred that the meaning of the term "international security" included elements unrelated to the military aspects of the issue. In his annual report, the Secretary-General had stressed the interrelationship between peace, development and democracy. The participants in the World Conference on Human Rights, held at Vienna, had called the right to development the most important element of universal progress. Accordingly, there could be no serious talk of international security until such time as justice prevailed in international economic relations; to that end, all members of the international community must contribute to collective development.

48. After a long period of stagnation in the area of nuclear disarmament, positive trends had emerged. Noting the importance of the preparations for the NPT review conference, he expressed regret at the modest results which had been achieved at the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee; the participants in the meeting had been unable to reach agreement even on procedural matters. In that connection, Ecuador hoped that the principled political stance adopted by States with regard to other aspects of the nuclear disarmament issue would also be apparent during future stages of those extremely important negotiations.

49. Ecuador attached special significance to the question of disarmament and development and believed that a more thorough examination of the interrelationship between those two processes would promote the implementation, at the national and the international levels, of a policy that would enable all mankind to reap the benefits of the "peace dividend".

(Mr. Ponce, Ecuador)

50. In connection with agenda item 155, Ecuador had expressed its views concerning the financing mechanism for the mine-clearance programme. In addition, it supported the idea of convening a conference to review the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

51. His delegation supported the steps taken by the Secretary-General to strengthen the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, as reported in document A/48/358. The international community would undoubtedly approve any measures designed to enhance the efficiency of work related to the consideration of disarmament matters. His Government expressed its appreciation to the Centre for the assistance which it had provided in the holding of the first seminar on matters relating to disarmament and international security, and hoped that cooperation in that area would increase.

52. He welcomed the successful results achieved at the latest session of the Disarmament Commission, and reaffirmed the importance which Ecuador attached to the successful conclusion of the Commission's discussion of the items relating to nuclear disarmament and the role of science and technology at its 1994 session. His delegation supported the proposal, referred to in General Assembly resolution 47/54 A that, at future sessions, the Commission should begin consideration of the items entitled "General guidelines for non-proliferation, with special emphasis on weapons of mass destruction" and "International arms transfer, with particular reference to resolution 46/36 H".

53. His delegation was also prepared to participate actively in the consultations to be conducted by the Chairman with a view to the further rationalization of the Committee's work.

54. Mr. LAAJAVA (Finland) said that the times called for new approaches to disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had been ratified by an unprecedented number of countries, formed the basis for international efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The example shown by the Republic of South Africa and the efforts being made by the Latin American countries reflected a growing recognition by countries that their national security could be strengthened through non-nuclear weapon status and adherence to the non-proliferation regime.

55. The decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT was a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. Finland urged that country to reverse its decision and to resume compliance with its international obligations.

56. In 1995 the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be extended unconditionally and indefinitely, as it was in the interests of all to preserve the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Together with the other Nordic countries, Finland appealed to those countries which had not yet done so, to accede to that Treaty. He welcomed the ratification by Belarus of the START-I Treaty and its accession to the NPT, and he urged Kazakhstan to fulfil its commitment by

(Mr. Laajava, Finland)

acceding to the NPT. It was to be hoped that Ukraine would accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and would ratify the START-I Treaty, thus making it possible to implement the START-II Treaty.

57. By the year 2003, the START treaties would have considerably reduced the strategic weapons arsenal. He also noted the major progress made in reducing the number of tactical nuclear weapons systems in Europe, as well as other weapons systems. On the whole, the danger of nuclear war in Europe had never been so remote.

58. A comprehensive nuclear-test ban would be an important means of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. An effective verification mechanism would be central in that regard. Finland hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would begin negotiations on that issue early in 1994. It noted with satisfaction that, since September 1992, the nuclear-weapon States had refrained from nuclear testing, and expressed regret that China had conducted such a test. It was also to be hoped that the international community would soon enter into negotiations on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The verification of the nuclear-test ban and of the halting of the production of fissionable material could be entrusted to IAEA.

59. As to the new steps being taken with regard to chemical and biological weapons, it was essential to remove all obstacles to the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention by those countries which had not yet done so. The successful carrying out of the preparatory work and the full implementation of the Convention constituted priorities in the area of disarmament. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention, Finland welcomed the results achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, and agreed with the conclusion that verification of the Convention would be possible.

60. Non-proliferation efforts must be complemented by effective export controls. Finland fully subscribed to all the multilateral export control regimes relating to weapons of mass destruction and noted that controls were not an obstacle to legitimate trade or transfers.

61. With regard to the need to step up efforts to prevent the excessive accumulation of conventional weapons, he appealed to countries which had not yet done so to make their national data available to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. He stressed the need to strengthen the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects and said that Finland supported the adoption of the proposed additional protocol to the Convention at the forthcoming review conference.

62. The new challenges in the field of disarmament highlighted the need to strengthen the multilateral disarmament machinery. With reference to the steps taken towards that end in the First Committee, at the resumed session in the spring of 1993, he said that there were still many unexploited possibilities for streamlining the Committee's work; in Finland's view, the First Committee should become the principal political committee of the General Assembly. He fully supported the Chairman's efforts to streamline the Committee's work.

(Mr. Laajava, Finland)

63. As had been emphasized at the resumed session, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs must have the requisite capacity to carry out its tasks. In that connection, adequate Secretariat support was required.

64. The Conference on Disarmament was the only global disarmament negotiating forum. During the past year, it had been engaged in reviewing its current composition, and Finland regretted that it had not yet been possible to reach agreement on that question. His delegation urged the States members of the Conference to pursue their efforts to reach a consensus during the inter-sessional period, before the next session of the Conference.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
6th meeting
held on
Wednesday, 20 October 1993
at 3 p.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Chairman:	Mr. von WAGNER	(Germany)
later:	Mr. PONCE (Vice-Chairman)	(Ecuador)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of the publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/48/SR.6
22 November 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

1. Mr. FOSTERVOLL (Norway) said that there was now an opportunity to build peace in the Middle East thanks to the courage and wisdom of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders and a need for collective political and financial efforts to consolidate their historic breakthrough and help to move the process forward. Arms control and disarmament remained an indispensable part of such a broad approach. The aim should be to introduce measures to build confidence and security which would contribute to transparency, predictability and crisis management. It was essential to draw on the experience and lessons of other regional arms-control negotiations. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a useful example in that regard. It was to be hoped that the building of confidence in the Middle East would also help to lower the level of armaments in the region and to channel vitally needed resources to economic and social development.

2. To halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction in all its aspects remained the main challenge. The outcome of the forthcoming conference to review the operation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was of utmost importance. The Treaty should be further strengthened and remain in force indefinitely. A cause for great concern in that connection was the refusal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with the safeguards obligations which it had entered into with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Norway had also repeatedly expressed its concern that Ukraine had not yet ratified the START-I Treaty or acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It urged Ukraine to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty without delay or prior conditions as a non-nuclear-weapon State, in accordance with the Lisbon Protocol.

3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was an essential but not sufficient condition for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It must become the centre-piece of a broader regime for cooperation among nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection Norway welcomed President Clinton's support for the conclusion of an international agreement banning the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes.

4. Until the conventions banning chemical and biological weapons were fully implemented by all States, export-control measures remained an important means of preventing the proliferation of dual-use chemical and biological products. The guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which all States should adopt, were an essential mechanism for preventing the spread of missile technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

5. There now seemed to be a real possibility of concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The nuclear-weapon States carried the main responsibility for that undertaking. Norway deeply regretted the decision of the Chinese Government to carry out an underground nuclear test. The resumption of testing by any of the nuclear Powers would seriously undermine the

(Mr. Fostervoll, Norway)

negotiating process and create doubts as to whether they were being conducted in good faith.

6. The signature of the Convention banning chemical weapons had been a triumph for the multilateral disarmament negotiations. Norway had ratified the Convention and called on other States to take the necessary steps to ensure its entry into force in January 1995. Norway was ready to play its part in a broad international effort to secure the timely and safe implementation of the provisions of the Convention and, in particular, to assist in the destruction of chemical weapons which might be located close to its territory.

7. In the area of conventional armaments, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was a cornerstone of the new European security structure. Recent developments, in particular the upsurge of regional armed conflicts at the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union, had given rise to demands for a revision of the CFE Treaty. That was not the right way to proceed. Any revision of the Treaty must take place in accordance with its own provisions and certainly not earlier than the time specified therein.

8. Norway regretted that the Conference on Disarmament had not yet been able to reach consensus on the question of the enlargement of its membership. The introduction of new members would strengthen the position of the Conference as a multilateral negotiating body and its legitimacy and credibility.

9. Mr. Ponce (Ecuador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

10. Mr. BOTEZ (Romania) said that the issues of arms control and disarmament were only components of a more comprehensive concept of international stability and security, and that disarmament was only one of the means of guaranteeing international security. Now that the irreconcilable confrontation between East and West was over, it was necessary to decide how to define what international security meant and how to ensure its maintenance in the post-cold-war period. The collapse of the transnational ideology of Marxism-Leninism had opened the road to conflicting ethnic and religious fundamentalist tendencies. The failure of the totalitarian guarantor of the large majority of European communist regimes - the USSR - and the failure of totalitarianism in general in Central and Eastern Europe had created new and fragile democratic States in which new forms of destabilizing civil intolerance and political extremism had become possible. Amidst the increasing disorder and crisis of confidence in neighbouring countries Romania remained an island of stability and peace, but the divergent tendencies in Europe were creating serious problems for its security. In an interconnected world, security problems in Europe had consequences far beyond the bounds of Europe. In that connection, the so-called North-South dialogue was gaining in significance in the contemporary world.

11. It was worth repeating that only a direct dialogue in which all of "we, the peoples", in the words of the Charter, participated on a democratic basis could make it possible to define in concrete terms what "security" and "stability" meant for different regions and times, and what was to be done to achieve them. The recent extraordinary events in South Africa and the Middle East fully bore

(Mr. Botez, Romania)

out that assertion. It only remained to be hoped that the world community would be able to extrapolate and apply in practice these new forms of conflict definition, control and resolution.

12. After so many years of totalitarian nightmare it was perfectly natural that the new democratic Romania should be extremely sensitive to such concepts as diversity and choice. Romania fully understood the unavoidable reality of the clash of interests in the world and believed that it was essential to devise a new philosophy to ensure stability and security on the basis of cooperation at the local and continental levels. Romania was determined to remain a point of stability in its troubled region. Building on its European traditions, it had recently joined the Council of Europe and, as a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, it wanted to consolidate its ties with the Alliance structures under any institutional formula of association offered to the countries of Central Europe, including full membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The achievement of that strategic objective should provide long-term guarantees for Romania's organic development in the spirit of its genuine historical tradition.

13. Romania's first concern in the matter of arms control and disarmament was nuclear arms control and disarmament. It was convinced that implementation of both START-I and START-II as well as the Lisbon Protocol was of vital importance. It welcomed the suspension of all nuclear tests and deplored any discontinuity in that respect. It strongly supported the unconditional and indefinite extension in 1995 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and took an active part in the international cooperation for combating the spread of all weapons of mass destruction. It had signed the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CCW) and attached great importance to the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Transparency in armaments remained one of its main concerns and it considered such transparency a necessary condition for decreasing the feelings of suspicion and confrontation inherited from the past.

14. The old adage that one should "think globally, but act locally", was fully met by the "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" prepared by the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The report of the Conference on Disarmament reflected serious efforts to renew and strengthen that important body. One of the most promising items of an updated agenda for the Conference could be the question of transparency in armaments. The idea of an international code of conduct regarding transparency in armaments could also be best dealt with in the Conference.

15. The new problems emerging from the end of the "cold war" demanded new goals and organizational structures for the United Nations. With regard to the First Committee, the question arose of whether its agenda was not overcharged and how many of its items remained relevant. Some progress had been made in "cleaning" the agenda but there was still a great deal of inertia which further efforts and perseverance were required to overcome.

16. Obviously, to rethink the entire Organization, when resources were limited and goals still fuzzy, was a much more difficult task. To accomplish it

(Mr. Botez, Romania)

required the same pragmatic and realistic spirit: it was necessary to meet today the challenges of the future. Only in that way could representatives rise to the level of their predecessors of 1945, who had designed a world organization able to meet international challenges for almost 50 years. It was necessary to examine alternative scenarios of world dynamics for the decades to come. To the "preventive diplomacy" so eloquently advocated by the Secretary-General must be added a preventive, or, more generally, an anticipatory design.

17. His delegation considered that it was counterproductive to remain intoxicated with the past in approaching the different proposals for the restructuring of the United Nations, including the Security Council. What was necessary at present was to construct an organization flexible enough to meet the yet unknown challenges of the next 50 years. That was no easy task, for it was necessary first to discover the stable axis of world evolution and then to develop appropriate tools to meet the coming tasks. It was in that context of looking to the future that Romania had decided to support Germany and Japan as legitimate candidates for permanent membership in the Security Council.

18. Mr. TOTH (Hungary), speaking as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, said that the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the Convention, had decided to establish the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint.

19. As a result of four sessions, held between March 1992 and September 1993, the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts had fulfilled its mandate and adopted a consensus report on its work. The measures identified had been grouped in seven broad categories. Off-site measures included information monitoring; data exchange; remote sensing and inspection. On-site measures consisted of exchange visits; inspections and continuous monitoring.

20. While recognizing the possible utility of other methodologies, the Group had agreed to use one methodology to assess illustrative but not exhaustive examples of various combinations of measures. Five combinations had been proposed as examples to illustrate the evaluation of enhanced capabilities and limitations: (1) declarations/multilateral information sharing/satellite surveillance/visual inspection; (2) information monitoring; (3) on-site inspection; (4) declarations/multilateral information-sharing/on-site visual inspection and (5) declarations/information monitoring.

21. The Group had decided by consensus to prepare a paper reporting the results of consultations on the question of types and quantities of agents. According to the paper, agreed lists, which were difficult to construct at the current stage, were a prerequisite to the implementation of many potential verification measures. The Group had examined the potential verification measures in terms, inter alia, of their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities.

(Mr. Toth, Hungary)

22. The findings of the Group concerning the identification, examination and evaluation of the 21 potential verification measures against the agreed mandated criteria indicated that capabilities and limitations existed for each measure in varying degrees, although reliance could not be placed on any single measure by itself to determine whether a State Party was engaging in prohibited activities.

23. The identified verification measures covered a variety of non-intrusive and intrusive measures. The Group had described the capabilities and limitations of the measures and evaluated their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities and their implications for the confidentiality of commercial proprietary information from a scientific and technical standpoint only. It was difficult to assess accurately the feasibility and effectiveness of all the measures within the context and criteria laid down in the Group's mandate. Concerns were expressed over the financial implications and the technical difficulties in the identification of biological agents as well as the need to ensure that sensitive commercial proprietary information and national security needs were protected in the implementation of any measure.

24. Mr. LISUCH (Slovakia) said that the current session was of historic significance for his country, as it was the first time independent Slovakia, one of the youngest Members of the United Nations, had had an opportunity to express itself in the First Committee on the entire range of issues involving arms control, disarmament, global stability and international security.

25. At the beginning of the 1990s a fundamental shift had taken place in the global order established at the end of the Second World War. As a result of the political changes most realists had abandoned the scholastic view of a bipolar world and begun to be aware of its complexity and multipolarity. The speed with which former enemies had become allies seeking peaceful and mutually favourable solutions to sensitive global and regional problems encouraged optimism. But the same developments had resulted in a resurgence of chaos in some regions of the world.

26. The European continent was laying the foundation for a new global stability. The Helsinki process was one of the ways to achieve the goals set. The world was witnessing the rapid adaptation of European and transatlantic institutions and organizations, which were increasingly engaging in mutual cooperation to resolve current problems. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided an important link between European and global security. It should therefore cooperate closely with the United Nations, particularly in preventing and resolving conflicts. Slovakia shared the opinion that cooperation between the United Nations and CSCE would be another positive step towards greater collaboration between existing international structures, which would enable the international community not only to adopt adequate measures but also to avoid duplication of the activities of those structures, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the use of human and material resources. At present, CSCE had no extensive experience in the field of peace-keeping operations, which traditionally remained the domain of the United Nations. However, there was still a considerable amount of work for CSCE to do, primarily

(Mr. Lisuch, Slovakia)

in the area of preventive diplomacy and the settlement of political conflicts. Successful and effective cooperation between the United Nations and CSCE could set a precedent for other regional organizations to follow.

27. Slovakia, which supported activities relating to disarmament and regarded the Conference on Disarmament as the most representative forum in that field, had applied for membership in the Conference. His country had succeeded to all agreements concerning arms control and disarmament signed by the former Czechoslovakia and had signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. It regarded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the cornerstone of all current efforts aimed at reinforcing the non-proliferation regime and fully supported the idea of extending that Treaty indefinitely.

28. Slovakia welcomed the initiative of the United States of America, the Russian Federation and France to extend the nuclear test moratorium, which it regarded as a positive response to long years of insistent appeals by the international community. The moratorium was the first step towards negotiations on the total prohibition of all nuclear arms tests in all environments. The extension of the nuclear test moratorium was an indication that verification of nuclear arms was possible by methods other than detection of nuclear explosions. His country was prepared to participate in the drafting of the text of a global agreement banning all nuclear tests. His delegation supported all proposals regarding a total ban on nuclear tests both above ground and underground, and fully endorsed the idea that the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty should herald the arrival of a new era, free of all nuclear test explosions.

29. The shift in the field of nuclear disarmament was accompanied by another element which his country considered important for the international community. The existing so-called "negative security assurances" were no longer consistent with the contemporary military and political situation. Unfortunately, the disintegration of military blocs had not led to the desired shift in the understanding of nuclear assurances. Such assurances should be set out in a legally binding document which would be global in scope, uniform, unconditional and comprehensive. His country supported the establishment of non-nuclear zones in various parts of the world. Furthermore, the question of so-called "positive security assurances" should not be forgotten. Security Council resolution 255 (1968) should be updated to include an explicit obligation to provide assistance and support to non-nuclear States should they become victimized by aggression.

30. His delegation commended the recent work of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Possible Verification Measures in relation to the Biological Weapons Convention, and regarded the Group's report as the beginning of a dialogue which should ultimately result in adequate and cost-effective verification of the stipulations of the Convention.

31. Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria) said that, since 1988, remarkable progress had been achieved in disarmament negotiations at both the bilateral and the multilateral levels, for example, the successful conclusion of the START-I and START-II Treaties by the United States and the Soviet Union and, later, the Russian Federation. However, those two countries still had more warheads in their arsenals than they had before the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nigeria believed that bilateral agreements should complement efforts to conclude multilateral agreements and that the United Nations should assume a key role in negotiations to that end.

32. The Convention on Chemical Weapons was an example of a successful agreement negotiated in a multilateral framework. He welcomed measures taken by the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. His country, which had had the privilege of serving as the first Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, appealed to all States which had not yet done so to sign the Convention and thus make it universal.

33. Nigeria welcomed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to commence the long-awaited negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty in January 1994. It believed that it would be most useful to identify and build a consensus on the objective criteria that must be met. Given the importance it attached to a comprehensive test ban, in particular because of its relationship to non-proliferation, Nigeria called for a speedy conclusion of the treaty by 1994. At the same time, the Amendment Conference of States Parties to the partial test-ban Treaty should continue to conduct parallel negotiations. His delegation welcomed the nuclear test moratorium announced by some nuclear-weapon States and appealed to all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action that might undermine that positive development.

34. In May 1993, the preparatory committee for the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had held its first session. Although much had been achieved at that session, difficult procedural and substantive problems remained. As the 1995 Conference approached, it should be borne in mind that its primary objective was both the review and the extension of the NPT. There was a need to examine how far the Treaty had prevented or failed to prevent the horizontal, as well as the vertical, spread of nuclear weapons; whether States parties to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations; how to encourage States which were not parties to the Treaty to accede to it; and what security assurances should be given to those States which had forsworn the option of possessing nuclear weapons. Nigeria believed that non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty should be given assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States through a legally binding agreement. Since the number of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had increased - while some fears of the effects of the free market in nuclear technology and the movement of highly skilled personnel might have been exaggerated - there were some questions that needed to be resolved regarding weaknesses in the multilateral non-proliferation regime, including the IAEA safeguards.

35. Since 1964, the African States had made strenuous efforts to denuclearize the continent. At present, a Group of Experts was drafting a treaty to that end. His delegation appreciated the assistance given to the Group of Experts

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

and urged the United Nations not to relax its efforts until the Group had completed its mandate. It looked forward to the early conclusion of the treaty and its entry into force.

36. The guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security, which had been unanimously adopted at the 1993 session of the Disarmament Commission, were timely and offered a useful framework for confidence-building, the de-escalation of tension and the implementation of practical disarmament measures at the regional level. However, the effectiveness of the guidelines depended on whether Powers outside the region respected regional agreements and refrained from arms exports that could destabilize peace in the region.

37. Since the United Nations had adopted new priorities in the area of disarmament and international security, the work of the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament should be reoriented accordingly. Their mandates should be expanded to enable them to carry out studies and seminars in the area of conflict management and peace-building, and their financial problems should be addressed.

38. The presence in the First Committee of current beneficiaries of the United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme, as observers, and of many graduates of the programme as representatives of their States bore witness to the programme's importance and vitality. As in previous years, that programme must be given proper financing.

39. Mr. SUCHARIPA (Austria) said that the numerous agreements concluded during the cold war era had responded to the problems of a bipolar world: stopping the arms race, controlling the danger of weapons of mass destruction and reducing the threat of war between the super-Powers. At the current stage, however, it was intra-State rather than inter-State conflicts which prevailed. The shift in the perception of threat had led to a broadened concept of international security, including both military and economic, social, ethnic, environmental and human rights aspects and their complex interrelationship. Accordingly, future peace and security structures must be based on two elements: reduced military expenditure and the building of universal economic, social and environmental security.

40. It had been argued that the opportunities created by the end of the cold war had not been fully utilized and that the world had become neither safer nor more stable. Since that time, however, important global and regional disarmament agreements had been concluded: the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) in 1993, the Convention on Chemical Weapons in 1992, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) in 1990 and the CFE-1A Agreement in 1992. In addition to specific disarmament measures, those agreements also stipulated specific procedures for their implementation and introduced rules of conduct for relations between States, thus creating a basis for the disarmament and arms control process for the present and the immediate future. It was vital that those agreements were adhered to.

(Mr. Sucharipa, Austria)

41. The outbreak of a third world war now looked highly unlikely, a number of regional conflicts in Latin America, Asia and Africa had been settled and, with the recent conclusion of an agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the peace process in the Middle East had taken a major step forward. Global military spending had dropped and savings in that area could well amount to US$ 1.5 trillion by the year 2000. The resources thus released provided an opportunity for the creation of new structures for peace and comprehensive security. The 1992 Human Development Report suggested that the rich nations should direct more resources to their lengthening social agenda and to assisting poorer countries, while the developing countries should invest more in the health and education of their people.

42. The multilateral disarmament machinery and the international system of security organizations had been created for the settlement of inter-State, not intra-State conflicts. In order to be able to deal effectively with the settlement of intra-State conflicts, the international system for conflict resolution and the multilateral arms control and disarmament agenda would have to be updated accordingly. At the same time, closer attention must be given to such issues as non-proliferation, the dismantling and destruction of weapons, the environmental aspects of disarmament and the conversion of military production. Existing security structures must be refashioned for preventive diplomacy and pre-emptive measures. The necessary integration of regional and global efforts must be based on close cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and others. His delegation supported growing efforts aimed at conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. It welcomed the statement by the Secretary-General in his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7), that the time had come for the integration of disarmament and arms regulation issues into the broader structure of the international peace and security agenda.

43. While it agreed that arms control and disarmament were an integral part of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building, Austria believed that work should also continue on traditional priority issues. Despite favourable developments, nuclear weapons maintained their prominence on the international disarmament agenda. The multilateral disarmament machinery must make increased efforts to secure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to stop the qualitative nuclear-arms race and to reduce the remaining nuclear arsenals.

44. The emergence of those new challenges to the non-proliferation regime had coincided with preparations for the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The breakup of the Soviet Union had raised questions about the future control of nuclear arsenals which had suddenly been removed from centralized command. Austria welcomed the recent accession of Belarus to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strongly encouraged Ukraine and Kazakhstan to comply with the 1992 Lisbon Protocol and to adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States as soon as possible. It also took note of the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and urged it to comply with the IAEA safeguards obligations. Austria was in favour of the further strengthening

(Mr. Sucharipa, Austria)

of the effectiveness and transparency of the IAEA safeguards. The right of IAEA to conduct special inspections of any site, even sites which had not been placed under Agency safeguards, must be reaffirmed. It also favoured a more comprehensive reporting system on nuclear imports and exports, with a view to ensuring that nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes were not diverted to military use.

45. In June 1992, the Austrian Parliament had called for an immediate stop to nuclear testing, even before the conclusion of the relevant international treaty. The de facto moratorium on nuclear tests, the absence of testing for more than a year and the consensus decision by the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) in January 1994, had all raised the hopes of the international community. There was therefore, all the more reason to regret that China had conducted a nuclear test and to hope that it would be an isolated event and would not lead to the resumption of testing by other nuclear-weapon States.

46. The widespread support for the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which had been signed by 150 States and ratified by four, augured well for the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention, a precondition for its full implementation. Austria highly commended the effective steps taken by the Provisional Technical Secretariat to put into place the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which would have to commence its functions by the time the Convention came into effect, which it hoped would be by the beginning of 1995.

47. With regard to biological weapons, Austria had expressed concern over the lack of verification procedures in the Biological Weapons Convention. It had therefore welcomed the decision of the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention to convene, as a first step, an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine possible verification measures. The report of the Group of Experts seemed to constitute a sound basis for the future elaboration of a verification mechanism which could ensure compliance with the Convention.

48. While considerable progress had been made in controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons were being used to cause loss of life and material destruction in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and in other regions as well. The issue of transparency in armaments had occupied a central place in the Committee's deliberations during previous sessions and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms had been set up in the hope that transparency might lead to future restraint in arms transfers. Austria shared the positive assessment of the Register by the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization. Confidence could be further increased by the expansion of the scope of the Register and consideration of problems related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and to weapons of mass destruction.

49. The Conference on Disarmament was conducting consultations on the expansion of its membership with a view to improving its efficiency as the sole multilateral body for disarmament negotiations. The list of States to be

(Mr. Sucharipa, Austria)

admitted as full members of the Conference included Austria. Austria, which had actively participated in the work of the Conference as an observer since 1979 and had applied for full membership as early as 1982, was very pleased at the prospect of finally becoming a full member. Although the Conference on Disarmament had not been able to reach a consensus on the expansion of its membership, Austria hoped to be accepted as a full member by the beginning of the 1994 session.

50. Mr. PALLAIS (Nicaragua), speaking on behalf of the Central American States, said that, with the end of the cold war, the international community was faced with new tasks - the elimination of poverty and deprivation throughout the world and the removal of the sources of economic inequality. The successes achieved in the area of disarmament, including the reduction of military budgets, made it possible to transfer attention to meeting vital needs in the area of social and economic development.

51. With regard to General Assembly resolution 47/52 L, he noted that two Central American countries had already provided information for the Register of Conventional Arms, acting in the spirit of a policy of full transparency and striving to attain such goals as the demilitarization of Central America and the promotion of general and complete disarmament. Prompted by the same considerations, the Central American countries had signed the Convention on Chemical Weapons. In view of the importance of the question of transparency in armaments, they supported Colombia's request for the inclusion of that topic in the agenda of the organizational session of the Conference on Disarmament in December 1993. Furthermore, they welcomed the recent decision of the nuclear Powers to extend unilaterally the moratorium on nuclear tests and their commitment to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

52. The Central American countries commended the work of the Amendment Conference of States Parties to the partial nuclear-test-ban Treaty and endorsed the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

53. In Central America, a process of radical restructuring was under way in the area of regional security. In the past, the concept of "security" had had a purely military meaning: national security doctrines had been designed to combat subversive activity without taking into account the economic and social roots of conflicts. Thus, a fragmented system of security had developed which only partially met the aspirations of the peoples of Central America.

54. The new concept of security in Central America was based on the coordination of efforts in the political, economic and social fields and in the field of development. That comprehensive concept was currently gaining increasing recognition. It was based on nine inextricably linked elements: the elimination of poverty; the consolidation of democracy; respect for human rights; the fight against drug trafficking; the establishment of a new environmental order; education and culture to educate the peoples in a spirit of

(Mr. Pallais, Nicaragua)

peace; a solution to external debt problems; access to international markets on just terms; and genuine and complete disarmament.

55. Following the signing by the Central American countries of the Esquipulas Agreements, which provided for the conclusion of an agreement on arms and military personnel, a Security Commission had been established. It had laid down specific objectives for future negotiations, worked out confidence-building measures between States, established a mechanism for monitoring compliance with agreements and introduced a system of maximum levels of weapons and armed forces. Recently the Commission had approved a preliminary mechanism for assistance, cooperation and coordination in the elimination of illicit transfers of arms in Central America, and it was currently working on a draft agreement on regional security.

56. With regard to the demilitarization of Central America, despite the difficulties involved, considerable success had been achieved: one example was the significant reduction in the military budget of Nicaragua. Moreover, the President of Nicaragua had recently formulated a concept regarding the role of the armed forces in a democratic society.

57. In El Salvador, with the end of the armed conflict and the fulfilment of the obligations deriving from the peace agreements, changes had taken place in the military sphere: the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) had been converted from a military group to a political organization and the armed forces had been reorganized. The Government of Honduras had reduced its armed forces and reassigned military units to civilian activities, particularly in the environmental and agricultural sectors. Those steps had naturally led to a considerable reduction of armaments.

58. The countries of Central America had made considerable progress towards the conclusion of a regional agreement on armed forces and armaments. They had already reached agreement on the basic concepts and forms of activity which would be included in that regional agreement.

59. Referring to the need to form a new democratic culture and to eradicate violence, he stressed the importance of formulating programmes to disseminate the ideas of peace, disarmament and the settlement of disputes through negotiation among the inhabitants of Central America.

60. As past experience showed, international security could be achieved only through the joint efforts of all the countries of the world, and its basic components were development, peace and democracy.

61. Mr. CHOWDHURY (Bangladesh) said, although the era of ideological confrontation was over, other forms of conflict had re-emerged, rooted in religious, linguistic, ethnic, economic and cultural differences between peoples. They posed a serious threat to peace and new modalities must be evolved to address those issues. The Committee's task was therefore greater rather than less. Its best approach in the circumstances was to take up issues in specific areas of inter-State relations.

(Mr. Chowdhury, Bangladesh)

62. One such area was nuclear non-proliferation. Bangladesh, as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stressed the need to strengthen the Treaty and remove its imperfections. A suitable forum for that would be the 1995 Review Conference, and the recently concluded Convention on Chemical Weapons should serve as a model. Bangladesh supported the idea of concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and hoped that agreement on it would be reached by 1994. It was absolutely essential to conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

63. In the case of conventional arms control it was essential to focus attention on the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory means of enhancing openness in the matter. Transparency, restraint, responsible policies and good-neighbourly behaviour were essential elements of the consolidation of regional and global stability, security and peace.

64. That was why Bangladesh was committed to the concepts of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace and believed that it was possible to build concentric circles of such zones to embrace the entire globe. Agreements on such zones must be concluded by consensus.

65. In an effort to make its contribution to the negotiations on disarmament issues Bangladesh had applied for membership of the Conference on Disarmament. It was in favour of an early decision on the expansion of the Conference's membership.

66. Confidence-building measures had a most positive impact on the consolidation of stability. One such measure might be the establishment of broad regional cooperation. Similarly, development was a great peace-maker. Surely now was the time for a peace dividend to be used to strengthen peace. As a least developed country, Bangladesh knew from its own experience what a big impetus additional resources could provide.

67. Mr. PALWANKAR (Observer for the International Committee of the Red Cross) emphasized the importance of the proposal to hold a conference to review the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, since such a conference would give States an opportunity - for the first time since the entry into force of the Convention in 1983 - to assess its impact and decide whether it needed to be amended in order to become more effective. The Convention had been adopted in 1980 as a result of various compromises. A number of issues which had been brought up by States were not covered in the text: in several cases because they were felt to be premature, and in others because further research was needed. The text had been intentionally adopted in the form of a convention with three protocols in order to enable States to add additional protocols dealing with different types of weapon as they were developed.

68. The forthcoming review conference would offer a unique opportunity to take stock of the use of conventional weapons in the contemporary world, to consider

(Mr. Palwankar)

whether the existing provisions provided adequate answers to existing problems and to look more carefully at the likely development of new types of weapon. In view of the increasing number of local conflicts in which the parties involved had access to the weapons available in the market and used them largely in an indiscriminate manner, States might consider whether the Convention's restriction of the use of weapons was really sufficient. Furthermore, in view of the close link between weapons use, trade and ownership, States should also consider a ban on the manufacture and export of those types of weapon which had excessively damaging or indiscriminate effects.

69. Careful thought should also be given to the fact that at present the Convention applied formally only to international armed conflicts, although the majority of conflicts were internal. Another important aspect of ensuring the effectiveness of a treaty was the means of its implementation, means which were noticeably lacking in the existing Convention.

70. The review conference provided an opportunity to assess whether the provisions of the existing Protocols were in fact adequate. Mines were the problem causing the greatest concern to the international community. ICRC could not but approve of the desire to find an effective solution to the appalling situation resulting from the massive and indiscriminate use of mines. In January 1994 it would be convening a meeting of military experts to study in greater detail the military utility of different types of mine and to consider possible alternative systems. The symposium on anti-personnel mines held in April 1993 had noted that that Protocol II, even if it was observed, had important shortcomings. It had proposed that serious thought should be given to a total ban on the use of certain types of mine. ICRC hoped that the valuable work done at such symposiums would be taken fully into account during the review conference.

71. States could also consider the possibility of regulating existing types of weapon which were not yet covered by the Convention. Where the development of new types of weapon was concerned, States were already in principle under an obligation to assess whether the use of a weapon under development would in some or all circumstances violate international humanitarian law. The adoption of preventive measures relating to the possible prohibition of types of weapon which had not yet been fielded would seem to make sense, for it would save enormous problems at a later stage. Accordingly, ICRC had held a series of expert meetings between 1989 and 1991 on the subject of blinding weapons. It had been motivated to convene the meetings by reports concerning the development of certain types of laser weapon which caused permanent and incurable blindness when used against persons over a range of about a kilometre. The majority of experts thought that the treaty regulation of such types of weapon would be advisable. It would also be possible to discuss more generally, in the light of the standards of humanitarian law, trends in future weaponry such as different types of directed-energy weapons.

72. In view of its mandate to work for the application and development of international humanitarian law, the importance of which had been recognized in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 47/56, ICRC attached great importance

(Mr. Palwankar)

to its participation on an equal footing in the work of the review conference. In particular, it could make documentation available and believed that, given its first-hand experience of the realities of armed conflicts and its long experience in the development of international humanitarian law, it could make an extremely valuable contribution.

73. ICRC hoped that the States which had not yet done so would ratify or accede to the Convention as quickly as possible. An increase in the number of parties would help to ensure that the forthcoming review conference would be as effective and productive as possible.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
7th meeting
held on
Thursday, 21 October 1993
at 3 p.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of the publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/48/SR.7
26 November 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

93-81762 (E)

/...

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AGENDA ITEMS (continued)

1. Mr. GUILLAN (Peru) noted with satisfaction that the world trend towards the reduction of military expenditures was continuing. The reduction of military budgets, the demobilization of forces and the conversion of military industries should make possible the redirection of resources to development needs. Recognizing the close connection between security and development, Peru had reduced its military expenditures considerably in order to devote itself to the reconstruction of its economic and social sectors and the struggle against poverty.

2. As a steadfast proponent of peace, Peru had concluded mutually beneficial agreements with its neighbours on integration and cooperation to establish a development zone, which was a bilateral confidence-building measure directly related to regional disarmament. It must be pointed out, however, that the consequences of the arms race deriving from the ideological confrontation between East and West were still making themselves felt and it was therefore necessary to speed up the process of disarmament.

3. Peru had always been interested in the practical implementation of regional programmes for the limitation of conventional arms. In that tradition, it had proposed at the first summit meeting of Latin American countries the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Latin America. The United Nations might lend additional impetus to that regional initiative with the help of its regional centres for disarmament.

4. Turning to the question of nuclear disarmament, he said that it remained urgent because the threats connected with the proliferation of nuclear weapons had not yet been eliminated. The peoples of the United Nations needed a new conception of international security. Peru was among those who were in favour of a nuclear non-proliferation regime without prejudice to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and considered that many regions might follow the example of the Latin American countries by establishing nuclear-free zones on the model of the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Peru was also in favour of the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the adherence to it of all States. For that reason, Peru had taken and would continue to take an active part in the preparation of the forthcoming review conference on the Treaty.

5. Referring to the need for cessation of all nuclear tests, he expressed hope that the current negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be successful, welcomed the decision of the nuclear Powers to extend the moratorium on nuclear tests and expressed regret that the tests recently carried out had broken that tacit international moratorium and might in turn give rise to a "chain reaction". Summing up, he said that further concrete results in the disarmament negotiations would be a pledge of peace and development.

(Mr. Guillan, Peru)

6. The current political situation made possible the full practical realization of the principles of the United Nations Charter. Peru attached great importance to the innovative ideas set out by the Secretary-General in his "Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277*-S/24111*). Peruvian contingents had already taken part in United Nations operations in various countries and his country was now considering the establishment of units earmarked for United Nations service. He added, however, that the new and complex tasks proposed in the "Agenda for Peace" should be matched by a new agenda for development intended to overcome the current stagnation of international cooperation in that field. In a world which was becoming one economic unit, the problems of political security could only be satisfactorily resolved if adequate attention was also given to social and economic problems.

7. Mr. DIMITROV (Bulgaria) said that Europe was not isolated from the contradictory trends of the present day. On the one hand, there were the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 1990 and the Vienna document of 1992 on confidence and security-building measures, which had established a stable new foundation for cooperative security within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and consultations with the Western European Union (WEU). A network of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community, the WEU and the Council of Europe would furnish the pillars of the future common security structure. Bulgaria was actively cooperating with NATO and openly declared its readiness to shoulder responsibility and act as a reliable partner, even to the extent of becoming a full member of that organization.

8. At the same time the war in former Yugoslavia condemned a part of Europe to long-term instability with direct negative consequences for the military security and economic situation of adjacent States. Bulgaria, with its constructive policy on the Balkans, played a stabilizing role in the region. However, the strict implementation of sanctions against former Yugoslavia had resulted in severe economic losses which might jeopardize the pace of reforms and social peace in Bulgaria. The President of Bulgaria had referred to that question in his address to the General Assembly at the current session. Bulgaria hoped that the international community would assist it in overcoming its economic and social problems.

9. The decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban was a major breakthrough in the decades-long effort to eradicate the nuclear threat. It was to be hoped that all nuclear-weapon States would live up to their enormous responsibility and would contribute to the early and successful outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. A future comprehensive test ban treaty should be verifiable, universally adhered to and of indefinite duration.

10. Among the priorities for peace and security, Bulgaria attached special importance to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the prevention of excessive accumulations of conventional weapons in regions of crisis or potential conflict. It regarded the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the major building block of the international arms control regime. Despite some criticism, it was broadly recognized that the treaty effectively served the

(Mr. Dimitrov, Bulgaria)

security interests of all States. Bulgaria favoured an indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty beyond 1995.

11. In its opinion, the recent positive developments in the direction of universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be consolidated through further steps towards the full implementation of all its provisions. In that context, Bulgaria looked forward to the early adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-weapon-free States of those independent republics of the former Soviet Union which had not yet joined it. The conclusion in 1993 of the START II Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation represented a further step in the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals and would greatly facilitate the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The viability of the non-proliferation regime would also be enhanced by extending credible and legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States parties to that Treaty.

12. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with respect to the nuclear safeguards regime should be further enhanced. IAEA must receive all the resources necessary to strengthen that regime, conduct special inspections and refer unresolved cases of proliferation to the Security Council, and all States should strictly abide by their international obligations to the Agency.

13. Bulgaria supported current efforts to widen and enhance international cooperation in implementing the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). His delegation welcomed the idea introduced at the current session of the General Assembly by the President of the United States of America of transforming MTCR from a limited-membership agreement to a set of rules that could command universal adherence to that regime. Bulgaria was ready to cooperate in the establishment of internationally agreed standards, guidelines and norms of export control of dual-use materials, equipment and technology for non-proliferation purposes. The underlying purpose of the harmonization of approaches to export controls was not to restrict international trade but rather to widen trade relations in sensitive areas, under effective non-proliferation commitments. Final preparations were being made in Bulgaria to establish a comprehensive national system of export controls in line with existing international standards and covering all sensitive areas, including nuclear, chemical, biological and missile-related items and technologies.

14. Bulgaria attached great importance to the entry into force in 1995 of the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and hoped that all countries would adhere to that Convention. Of the more than 150 States that had already signed the Convention, Bulgaria had been among the first to sign in January 1993 and was in the process of preparing its early ratification. Bulgaria had ensured the successful start of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague by contributing in advance to its budget. Bulgaria was ready to participate in the forthcoming pilot inspections and to submit all data and information as required under the Convention.

(Mr. Dimitrov, Bulgaria)

15. Another urgent and achievable goal was the establishment of an effective mechanism for verifying compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. His delegation supported the convening of a special conference to examine the final report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures.

16. Bulgaria shared the view that increased openness and transparency in armaments could strengthen peace and stability. The Register of Conventional Arms, which the Organization had established in 1993, would be an effective international instrument for preventing excessive stockpiling of offensive conventional weapons. The Government of Bulgaria had submitted for inclusion in the Register all the necessary data on arms transfers and other available background information, as provided in General Assembly resolution 46/36 L of 9 December 1991 and 47/52 L of 15 December 1992. It hoped that all Member States would be equally willing to support the effective functioning of the Register. The inclusion in the reports of information relating to national production was an important element of the future evolution of the Register. In the interest of promoting conventional disarmament and transparency, Bulgaria supported the convening of a review conference of the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

17. Bulgaria noted with satisfaction that the Disarmament Commission had agreed on guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security (A/48/42, annex II). The guidelines were a timely document, and his delegation was prepared to support a draft resolution on the subject.

18. The elaboration of effective arms control and disarmament verification procedures could contribute to a climate of trust and understanding among States. His delegation would support a decision on further research or the updating of the 1990 report of the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts on the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification (A/45/372 and Corr.1, appendix). In accordance with General Assembly resolution 47/45 of 9 December 1992, Bulgaria had submitted its detailed views on the subject (A/48/227/Add.1).

19. Bulgaria noted with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on a United Nations study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space (A/48/305). The report gave special consideration to multilateral mechanisms for international cooperation. As a country that had participated in the preparation of the study, Bulgaria was prepared to sponsor a resolution on the subject, which would recommend that Member States should take into account the conclusions contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts in their future activities.

20. Mr. VORONTSOV (Russian Federation) said that, as the President of the Russian Federation had declared in his address of 8 October 1993, Russian foreign policy would remain unchanged. Under existing conditions, the Russian Federation's attention in the area of disarmament would be focused on the

(Mr. Vorontsov, Russian Federation)

implementation, at the lowest possible costs, of arms reduction agreements; the conclusion of the process of coordinating new agreements in the course of the negotiations already under way; efforts to prevent the proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery and the newest technologies of arms production; the development of further arms regulation measures in areas where such measures had not yet been taken, and the deepening of confidence- and security-building measures in relations between States.

21. His delegation supported the main guidelines and theses of the Secretary-General's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (A/C.1/47/7), and stressed that the integration of disarmament and security-building efforts would help strengthen the independent role of the disarmament process.

22. His delegation emphasized the importance of the earliest entry into force of the 1991 Treaty between the USSR and the United States of America on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic offensive Arms (START-I), which had already been ratified by four of its five participants. His delegation called on friendly Ukraine to ratify START-I as soon as possible, fulfil its obligation under the 1992 Lisbon Protocol and, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That would open the way for the entry into force of the START-II Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. The Russian Federation was convinced that the Russian-Ukrainian agreements on nuclear issues, signed by the prime ministers of the two countries in the Crimea on 3 September 1993 removed all questions and doubts that might have existed with respect to the advisability of the earliest ratification of START-I.

23. The Russian Federation attached paramount importance to the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the regime based thereon. The Treaty should become universal, and the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty should make it of unlimited duration. His delegation welcomed the accession of Belarus, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, to that Treaty, and expected that the example of Belarus would be followed without further delay by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other countries of the former Soviet Union that had not yet done so. He called upon other States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty to consider the issue once again, taking into account the specific steps that were being taken by the major nuclear Powers.

24. The Russian Federation welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had finally reached an important decision to start multilateral negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It was essential to ensure that those negotiations did in fact open in January 1994, when the Conference on Disarmament began its session, and that the General Assembly should declare its unanimous support for the negotiations. He hoped that the recent test conducted by China, which had provoked universal dismay, would remain an isolated episode. The Russian Federation called for restraint in that area.

25. The Conference on Disarmament must start focused discussions on the elaboration of a multilateral agreement on security assurances to non-nuclear-

(Mr. Vorontsov, Russian Federation)

weapon States, under which both nuclear and non-nuclear countries would enter into specific mutual obligations.

26. The Russian Federation intended to initiate substantive discussions in the Conference on Disarmament on developing a multilateral agreement on the verifiable cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Such an agreement would presumably necessitate arrangements whereby all nuclear-weapon Powers would place weapons materials released in the process of destroying nuclear weapons under IAEA international controls. In the interests of transparency, the Russian Federation was ready to exchange, within that framework, data on the quantity of such materials and their storage facilities.

27. At the current session, the Russian Federation had already confirmed its intention to accede to the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and called upon all States possessing such technology to follow suit. In that process, it was essential to agree upon equal rights and obligations for the participants, which would make possible the unimpeded export of peaceful space technologies. The Russian Federation was prepared to consider placing its satellite launching technology at the disposal of international projects, including those under United Nations auspices. In the long term, it was advisable to consider establishing, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations, an international mechanism to control the export of missiles and missile technology with the participation of both supplier States and countries interested in obtaining rocket technologies for peaceful purposes.

28. The Russian Federation affirmed the historic importance of the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC) and supported the efforts by the Preparatory Commission for the Organization on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to prepare the Convention's entry into force. The Russian Federation welcomed the signing of the CWC by more than 150 States and hoped that it would become truly universal.

29. Continued efforts were also needed to strengthen the regime of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In the view of the Russian Federation, the results of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts which had studied potential verification measures were positive. It favoured the convening of a special conference of States parties to the Convention, to consider the report by the Group of Experts and to determine follow-up measures to establish the Convention's verification mechanism.

30. Commending the establishment by the United Nations of the Register of Conventional Arms, the Russian Federation confirmed its intention to continue to provide data to the Register on a yearly basis, supported further consideration of the issue of transparency in armaments at the Conference on Disarmament and in other international forums and had no objection to the inclusion of that item in the agenda of the Disarmament Commission. His delegation also reaffirmed the intention of the Russian Federation to continue to provide data to the United Nations in accordance with the standardized reporting system on military expenditures.

(Mr. Vorontsov, Russian Federation)

31. There was an increasingly urgent need for regional and subregional disarmament measures. In that context, he stressed the importance of the implementation of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security, agreed upon earlier in 1993 by the Disarmament Commission.

32. The Russian Federation believed that the elaboration of effective agreements with a strong disarmament component should form an integral part of United Nations peace-keeping activities. In view of the sharp increase in the scale of internal ethnic conflicts and in the bloodshed resulting therefrom, it had put forward an initiative to establish restrictions under international law on the use of the most destructive and indiscriminate weapons systems in those conflicts.

33. Most important among the new problems faced at the current stage of disarmament was that of the conversion of military industrial facilities to civilian purposes. The United Nations could promote practical measures designed to increase investments for conversion purposes by conducting studies and making recommendations on various aspects of conversion.

34. The Russian Federation welcomed the combined approach to the consideration of disarmament issues and the strengthening of international security which had become established practice in the First Committee. With a view to ensuring that the United Nations fulfilled its mandated role as an effective peacemaking organization, a draft resolution had been prepared on the maintenance of international security and his delegation, together with the other sponsors, intended to submit it for consideration by the First Committee.

35. During the spirited discussion of the issue, there had appeared to be agreement that it would be inadvisable to undertake a radical rearrangement of the mechanism for negotiation and deliberation in the area of disarmament, although a gradual development of that mechanism was still possible. In that connection, his delegation hoped that the consultations on the issue of expanding the membership of the Conference on Disarmament would be successfully concluded before its next session. As for the First Committee itself, his delegation supported the initiative for the rationalization of its agenda.

36. Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) said that, despite many uncertainties in the unfolding new world, current changes raised hopes of a safer world and a more stable international order.

37. Mongolia attached particular significance to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a measure to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. The signing of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) was an important step in the process of nuclear disarmament and Mongolia hoped that other nuclear States would join that process. It also hoped that the example of Belarus, which had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), would be followed by the other States which had signed the 1992 Lisbon Protocol.

38. Noting the growing importance of the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, he said that, in his country's opinion, the NPT

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

should be strengthened and extended indefinitely at the 1995 Conference. It was vital for all parties to the Treaty to comply fully with their commitments.

39. In that connection, particular importance was attached to the cessation of nuclear tests and he noted the exceptional importance of the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. All the necessary prerequisites were in place for work on that issue to be completed at an early date and it would be only logical for that work to be completed before the 1995 Conference.

40. His delegation believed that all avenues should be explored in attaining the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and reiterated its view that a practical step towards that goal would be to amend the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. A successful outcome to negotiations on a comprehensive test ban would be greatly assisted if States refrained from conducting nuclear tests. Expressing his regret over the recent underground nuclear test conducted by China, he urged that country not to carry out any more tests and expressed the hope that other nuclear Powers would continue their moratorium.

41. His country had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone and supported the idea of turning the whole Central Asian region into such a zone. Mongolia was also in favour of the early conclusion of a legally binding agreement on nuclear security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and supported the idea of convening a special conference of States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention.

42. With regard to the issue of mine clearance, Mongolia had been a sponsor of the resolution on that subject recently adopted by the General Assembly and sympathized with the idea of convening a review conference of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

43. In connection with the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters (A/47/42, Annex 1), his country noted with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament had established an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments. The 1993 substantive session of the Commission had adopted guidelines and recommendations for a regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security. Although it had fallen short of reaching agreement on another important item on its agenda - the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields - his country hoped that the Commission would be able to finalize its work on the matter at its next session. His delegation deemed it necessary that agreement should be reached as soon as possible on the inclusion of that new item in the agenda of the Commission's next session.

44. In conclusion, he said that his delegation attached great importance to efforts to improve the existing disarmament structures of the United Nations, including the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. The activities of the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament had proved to be increasingly

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

effective in encouraging regional dialogue and confidence-building, and they should be supported in every way possible. His delegation also looked forward with interest to the deliberations on the question of further rationalizing the work of the First Committee.

45. Mr. RAZALI (Malaysia) said that the winds of change from the end of the cold war had left indelible imprints on issues relating to disarmament and international security. The threat of a nuclear holocaust from two ideologically distinct and antagonistic blocs was over. There had been positive developments in the field of nuclear, chemical and conventional disarmament. Regional measures had played their own important role. The United Nations, and in particular the General Assembly, had been in the forefront of the global drive towards genuine disarmament. Yet the world was still far from having achieved complete disarmament.

46. Malaysia remained committed to the goal of attaining complete disarmament. Nuclear weapons should no longer be a factor of power leverage in relations between States. In that connection, it was important that the moratorium on testing should be firmly maintained.

47. The Chemical Weapons Convention, signed in January 1993, could be termed the most serious attempt to curb proliferation by eliminating a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. The Convention's provisions on the destruction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and on international verification were new benchmarks for future arms limitation agreements. Agreement on the Convention had been achieved on the basis of compromises and concessions that had made it possible to find a reasonable balance between the need for confidence-building and verification and the sovereign right of Member States to protect national security interests by peaceful means. His country believed that the Convention could also be used to improve the Biological Weapons Convention.

48. He welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had been mandated to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Among the most pressing issues to be resolved was the relationship between negotiations in the Conference and any parallel consultations or negotiations among the five nuclear Powers and the Amendment Conference of States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. Malaysia shared the view that the Conference should be given the primary role. In that connection, he underlined the need for an internationally applicable verification system for compliance with the comprehensive test-ban treaty. It should clearly be universally applicable - applicable to non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to nuclear-weapon States. The conclusion of such a treaty would also have a decisive influence on the outcome of the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

49. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, with 157 States parties, was so far the most widely supported arms control treaty in existence. Its major weakness was that it was discriminatory, in that it made a distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States - the "haves" and the "have-nots". It also suffered from several shortcomings, especially with regard to its monitoring and verification mechanism. With its concentration on averting horizontal

(Mr. Razali, Malaysia)

proliferation, the Treaty did not deal in an effective way with vertical proliferation. A holistic approach to non-proliferation - universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory - was urgently needed. Malaysia shared the view that there should be universal adherence to the Treaty and that it should be unconditionally and indefinitely extended in 1995. Putting an end to proliferation and eliminating nuclear weapons was particularly significant, given that a number of non-nuclear-weapon States had voluntarily decided not to acquire nuclear weapons.

50. An important focus of confidence-building measures was transparency in armaments. International security and stability would be enhanced by increased openness and transparency in the military field, particularly in the area of arms transfers. There was therefore an urgent need to ensure the success of the Register of Conventional Arms and to expand its scope by including further categories of equipment and data relating to military holdings and procurement, as well as detailed information on research and development, arms storage conditions and military budgets.

51. Malaysia believed that the United Nations had a pivotal role and primary responsibility with regard to all disarmament issues. In particular, it was in favour of the General Assembly playing a greater role in all multilateral disarmament efforts, in addition to the role played by the Security Council, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". Malaysia shared the belief expressed in that report that disarmament was the responsibility of all States. It also supported the Secretary-General's call for the countries in a region to take the initiative on their own or in consultation with international organizations to work towards greater transparency in the transfer of armaments and disarmament.

52. There was a clear connection between disarmament and development. Excessive military expenditure stifled economic growth and adversely affected the scope and content of international economic cooperation. Third world countries could not afford to join in the arms race. The developing countries and those with economies in transition needed development, not armaments. Although the so-called "peace dividend" had never materialized, productive resources freed as a result of disarmament should add to the possibilities of alleviating poverty, from which a quarter of the world's population continued to suffer. At the same time, it was important to remember that the settlement of regional disputes was essential for the creation of conditions which would enable States to reallocate their limited resources to economic growth and development.

53. Given the importance of the Conference on Disarmament, his country called on the members of the Conference to take into account the views of countries which were not members, and supported the expansion of its membership.

54. The times were conducive to the achievement of genuine disarmament. A new system of international security had to be established, instilling States with confidence that they no longer needed abundant weaponry. Such a system should also deal with problems relating to effective weapons disposal and the consequences of implementing reductions and include specific measures to

(Mr. Razali, Malaysia)

redirect manufacturing and research and development capacities from military to civilian endeavours.

55. Mr. DANKWA (Ghana) said that the contours of the world order which countries sought to construct out of the debris of the cold war remained undefined. The international community had come to the realization that peace could not be secured on the basis of the accumulation of the most effective and deadly weapons. The cherished concept of the "balance of power" had been shown to be merely a contrivance for the competitive acquisition of arms and ammunition. The concept of security that had evolved during the cold war appeared outdated. Security should no longer be defined in terms of the survival or dominance of the mighty. Nor should it be rooted in unregulated struggle among States to impose their will on each other. A lasting peace should be founded on the purposes and principles of the Charter.

56. His delegation was convinced that the acquisition of arms was by no means the best nor indeed the most effective means of guaranteeing security. Lasting peace could only be achieved through freedom, equality, justice and law. For that reason the First Committee should pay due attention to the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as required under Article 11 of the Charter of the United Nations. The General Assembly, through the Committee, must play its role in guaranteeing peace and security.

57. His delegation shared the regret and concern expressed by the international community following the nuclear explosion carried recently by China. In that connection, credit was due to the other four nuclear Powers who had decided to maintain their voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing.

58. While the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations in January 1994 on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was welcome, it fell short of the expectations and specific request of the General Assembly, as contained in its resolution 47/47 of 9 December 1992. For if the Conference failed to heed the wishes of the Member States of the Organization, as reflected in the resolutions of the relevant organs, then the agreement reached on general and complete disarmament could not be placed under effective international control - that was the understanding on which the General Assembly had adopted its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961. The same consideration also explained the urgent need to broaden the membership of the Conference with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of its decisions. The need to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference should no longer be seen in the cold-war context - of ensuring geographical balance with due regard for the particular responsibilities of the nuclear Powers now seemed more relevant.

59. With regard to preparations for the 1995 review conference, Ghana considered that the nuclear and threshold States would have to commit themselves to complete and total disarmament before the non-nuclear States would agree to relinquishing their nuclear potential. The discriminatory notion that some countries could be entrusted with nuclear weapons while others could not was unacceptable to his delegation. As to the duration of the extension of the Treaty, that would be determined by the nature and scope of the review of its application.

/

(Mr. Dankwa, Ghana)

60. Given its preference for peace and security founded on freedom, equality, justice and law, the delegation of Ghana expressed concern regarding the appearance of a new restricted club, namely the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It would have been preferable if the initiative on that regime had been developed within the framework of the United Nations, without creating the impression that it had been imposed on Members. An example of how that could have been done was the Chemical Weapons Convention, signed in January 1993.

61. The General Assembly had been expected at its forty-seventh session to extend the scope of the Register of Conventional Arms, established by General Assembly resolution 467/36. However, in General Assembly resolution 47/52, it had merely taken note of the suggestions made by the Secretary-General. In that connection it should be stressed that the continued operation of the Register beyond the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly would be determined by the efforts of Member States, through a General Assembly resolution, to extend the scope of the Register.

62. The end of the cold war and the economic recession sweeping through the world confirmed the urgent need to carry out internal and external reforms and to reject dependency on military might. Nuclear-test-ban and non-proliferation arrangements, missile technology control, verification measures and the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be seen as transitory arrangements with a view to complete and total disarmament. The implementation of such measures was likely to check the tendency to resort to military might for the solution of what were essentially political problems. For that reason Ghana urged the Committee to supplement the disarmament and arms control measures with positive confidence-building measures in accordance with the provisions of the Secretary-General's report "An Agenda for Peace". It was essential to speed up the process of converting military structures, while regional disarmament centres should be provided with adequate resources to implement such confidence-building measures at regional level.

63. Mr. Pengiran Abdul MOMIN (Brunei Darussalam) said that the work of the Committee and its appraisal of the Secretary-General's report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" would be most timely. Although there had been a number of positive developments since the Committee had last met, the momentum towards achieving greater global security seemed to have slowed down.

64. His delegation congratulated the United States and Russian Federation on having signed the Start-II Treaty; it hoped that the Treaty would be implemented and that efforts would be made by the signatory States to resolve any remaining difficulties. It was pleased that many countries had signed the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and hoped that good progress would be made by the time of the 1995 review conference. It also welcomed the fact that the Chemical Weapons Convention had been signed by such a large number of countries, and hoped that number would increase in future and that the Convention would be ratified and fully implemented.

65. The delegation of Brunei Darussalam was concerned by the fact that in many regions the arms race continued unabated. The members of ASEAN were committed

(Mr. Pengiran Abdul Momin,
Brunei Darussalam)

to promoting peace and security through dialogue, cooperation and peaceful coexistence. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the fact that the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South-East Asia had been unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session. The Treaty would increase mutual trust not only among the ASEAN member countries, but also with neighbouring States. Furthermore, ASEAN had launched a regional forum in which countries from the region as well as outside the region took part to discuss security matters of common concern. Such regional arrangements complemented the peace-building efforts of the United Nations. It was vital that members of the Organization should work together to promote international peace and security.

66. Mr. KEATING (New Zealand) said that the work of the United Nations in disarmament matters had been a major priority for New Zealand. A new climate of trust and cooperation had begun to characterize relations in the United Nations system. It opened up new opportunities for resolving disarmament issues on a multilateral level.

67. The most important event in the field of disarmament in 1993 had been the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to launch negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. New Zealand had firmly opposed nuclear testing in all international forums and each year had submitted resolutions to the First Committee urging the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiating an effective and verifiable ban on the testing of all nuclear devices in all environments. The negotiations would be greatly facilitated if the nuclear-weapon States carried out no further nuclear tests. His delegation greatly appreciated the restraint of the United States, the Russian Federation, France and the United Kingdom, which had not conducted any tests for more than a year, but noted with regret that China continued its tests.

68. The proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the most serious threats to the world, in its search for stability after the cold war. The centrepiece of the non-proliferation regime was the NPT. The real progress achieved in recent years in the field of nuclear disarmament through joint action taken by the United States, the former Soviet Union and subsequently the Russian Federation should help to create favourable conditions for the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995.

69. In spite of the significant achievements, the NPT had not yet lived up to the expectations of its drafters. Some of the major Powers had still not adhered to it, prompting concern among the international community. A further cause of concern was the action of certain countries which were party to the Treaty. New Zealand called upon all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to recognize the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

70. Many members of the international community, including countries in the Asia-Pacific region had been following the activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with great concern. New Zealand had joined other countries - the last time at the IAEA general conference - in urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its obligations under the Treaty and in connection with safeguards, which remained in force. That country's

(Mr. Keating, New Zealand)

unwillingness to comply with the safeguards agreement was one of the reasons for the serious problems in regional and international security. Iraq's non-compliance with its obligations under the Treaty also testified to the urgent need to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

71. His country continued to be concerned about the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. The Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the NPT were key documents in that field. Kuwait had given full support to the preparations for the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and to the work recently concluded by the experts regarding verification measures relating to biological weapons, whose final report provided a solid basis for further work to elaborate a comprehensive and effective verification regime for the Biological Weapons Convention. His delegation urged all States Parties to request the depository Powers to convene a special conference of States Parties to launch the negotiation process in 1994.

72. While the potential for destruction posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons was vast, it should not be overlooked that almost all death and destruction in war had been caused by conventional weapons, which consumed the bulk of the world's excessive military expenditure. In 1991, a concrete step had been taken to increase mutual confidence and security through measures to increase transparency in armaments and openness in conventional arms transfers. New Zealand was among the 80 States which had provided information for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

73. His country, which had participated in mine-clearing operations in Afghanistan and Cambodia, had ratified the Convention on Prohibitions of Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Inhumane Weapons Convention) and its Protocols. Aware of the need to address a number of serious weaknesses which limited its effectiveness, his delegation supported the call to convene a review conference which would seek to strengthen the Convention.

74. In order to attain the key goals in the area of disarmament and arms control, it was necessary to strengthen and make more effective the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery, which must adapt to the new international situation. His delegation believed that disarmament and international security items should be fully merged in the general debate and for consideration and action on resolutions, and that international security issues should be given the attention that they deserved in the debate.

75. The Disarmament Commission had taken some steps to streamline its agenda and working methods. Noting that the three-item phased agenda remained an important goal, he said that the results of the past session had been mixed. The completion of the item on the regional approach to disarmament was among the achievements, and his delegation was particularly pleased that the adopted guidelines and recommendations (A/48/42, annex II) recognized the significance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and stated that extraregional States should respect the status of such zones. An important contribution of the South Pacific region to promoting the principle of non-proliferation was the establishment, in accordance with the 1985 Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the southern part of

(Mr. Keating, New Zealand)

the Pacific Ocean (the Treaty of Rarotonga), of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone. His delegation regretted that despite its considerable efforts, the Disarmament Commission had not yet achieved consensus on the item on the role of science and technology, and welcomed the fact that the item would be discussed during the informal consultations along with the item on nuclear disarmament.

76. If the Conference on Disarmament was to maintain its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament agreements, its membership should be expanded. The international community sought an early and satisfactory resolution of that matter.

77. In conclusion, he noted that the First Committee was the central political organ in the United Nations disarmament machinery. It was one of the few bodies in which not only the great and powerful States but also the groups of smaller States could create a climate of confidence and security. The progress made by the First Committee each year enabled the United Nations to retain its critical role in promoting the implementation of practical disarmament measures and strengthening international security.

78. Mr. ABULHASAN (Kuwait) said that 50 years of bipolarity in the world had made it impossible to settle many conflicts. With the ending of the cold war, there was a growing conviction within the United Nations that it was possible to establish a system of maintaining international peace and security based on disarmament and the allocation of resources for social and economic development and the protection of human rights.

79. Among the most notable recent achievements was the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In that regard, he commended the decision of the United States of America to introduce a moratorium on testing through the end of 1994. Kuwait urged all nuclear-weapon States to follow that example.

80. Peace was not an abstract concept but an expression of the will of all States and, in order to maintain peace, it was necessary to respect the principles of international law embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations, the principle of equal rights and obligations of States, the principle of peace and stability for all, the principle of the full understanding of "security" and the inadmissibility of the selective approach to defending the security of States. Kuwait had made its contribution to the United Nations effort to lay the foundations for a new world order that promoted the respect of the sovereignty and independence of States, observed the inviolability of international borders and guaranteed territorial integrity and right to dispose of one's natural resources. Therefore, when Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, owing to the international will of States, expressed through the United Nations, that act of aggression was repulsed and Kuwait was liberated. The demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border constituted a significant contribution by the international community to the elimination of a regional hotbed of tension.

81. Kuwait, well aware of the danger of acquiring weapons of mass destruction, supported all international efforts to limit their proliferation and destroy them. His country's signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention bore witness to

(Mr. Abulhasan, Kuwait)

that fact. His country was a party to the NPT, and supported all efforts aimed at transforming the Middle East into a region that was free of all forms of weapons of mass destruction. His delegation called on all States of the Middle East, including Israel, to adhere to the NPT and to open their nuclear facilities to international inspection. Similar principles for new relations in the Middle East had been set forth in the study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (A/45/435, annex) prepared by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 43/65 of 7 December 1990. Progress towards establishing a nuclear-free zone required a major contribution on the part of the States of other regions, primarily the nuclear Powers.

82. The States of the Middle East also needed to adopt measures which provided for their accession to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The fact that Iraq was not yet a Party to that Convention was a source of concern. It was a comfort to note that the Special Commission established under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) on 3 April 1991 had been entrusted in particular with the elimination of such weapons. The regime in Iraq, by virtue of its actions and its very essence, continued to threaten peace and security in the region. It continued to ignore the unanimous call that it respect all resolutions on the question of the aggression against Kuwait. However, his country was convinced of the Security Council's capacity to induce Iraq to fulfil its obligations under the Security Council resolutions and the requirements of international law.

83. It was to be hoped that the entire world would learn from Kuwait's bitter experience, and understand, in particular, the need for transparency in armaments, and that experience would be a deterrent to arms deliveries. Iraq's failure to comply with the NPT confirmed the importance of participating in and implementing disarmament agreements. It was also important to comply with the MTCR, as the proliferation of missiles as a form of conventional weapons and a means for delivering weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to regional and international security.

84. In Kuwait's view, that security in the Gulf was closely linked to international security. There were States in the world which were engaged in stockpiling conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and it was up to the international community to reduce the threat that presented. One way to achieve that goal was through observance and verification. He emphasized the importance of preventive diplomacy as one of the pillars of the maintenance of peace in the world, particularly in areas of tension.

85. In conclusion, he commended the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament agreements. Kuwait was convinced of the importance of the Conference, and hoped that it would soon be included in its membership.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.